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Judicious Imprisonment 
Does Current Sentencing for Non-violent Offenses Promote Political Legitimacy? 
 
Gregory Jay Hall 
 
ABSTRACT 
Starting August 21, 2018, Americans incarcerated across the United 
States have been striking back—non-violently.
1
 Inmates with jobs are 
protesting slave-like wages through worker strikes and sit-ins.
2
 Inmates 
also call for an end to racial disparities and an increase in rehabilitation 
programs.
3
 Even more surprisingly, many inmates have begun hunger 
strikes.
4
 Inmates are protesting the numerous ills of prisons: 
overcrowding, inadequate health care, violence, disenfranchisement of 
inmates, abysmal mental health care contributing to inmate suicide, and 
more.
5
 While recent reforms have slightly decreased mass incarceration, 
the current White House administration could likely reverse this trend. 
President Donald Trump’s and Attorney General Jeff Sessions’s 
statements and policies that call for increased mandatory sentences, 
cracking down on illegal immigrants, and aggressively enforcing drug 
laws might be the iron fist that breaks the back of an already collapsing 
criminal justice system.
6
 Many, including judges currently sitting on the 
bench, believe that numerous unjust laws and their unjust penalties have 
brought the United States penal system to this breaking point.
7
 To those 
                                                          
1
 Amani Sawari, Jared Ware, & Incarcerated Workers Organizing Committee, Strike Statement 
to the Press: Statement Regarding the Ongoing Nationwide Prison Strike, INCARCERATED 
WORKERS ORGANIZING COMMITTEE (Aug. 28, 2018), https://incarcerated workers.org/news/ 
strike-statement-press-august-28-2018.  
2
 Id.; German Lopez, America’s Prisoners Are Going on Strike in at Least 17 States, VOX (Aug. 
22, 2018), https://www.vox.com/2018/8/17/17664048/national-prison-strike-2018. 
3
 Id.  
4
 Id.; Sawari, Ware, & Incarcerated Workers Organizing Committee, supra note 1.  
5
 Id.; Lopez, supra note 2.  
6
 Gaby Galvin, Underfunded, Overcrowded State Prisons Struggle With Reform: It Took a 
Correctional Officer’s Death for Delaware’s Legislature to Address its Prison Problem (July 26,   
2017),   https://www.usnews.com/news/best-states/articles/2017-07-26/understaffed-and-over 
crowded-state-prisons-crippled-by-budget-constraints-bad-leadership.  
7
 THE ECONOMIST, Rough Justice in America: Too Many Laws, Too Many Prisoners: Never in 
the Civilised World Have So Many Been Locked Up for So Little (July 22, 2010), 
https://www.economist.com/briefing/2010/07/22/too-many-laws-too-many-prisoners; see also 
Anonymous & Beth Schwartzapfel, My Friend Killed Himself in an Alabama Prison, THE 
MARSHALL PROJECT (July 13, 2017), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2017/07/13/my-friend-
killed-himself-in-an-alabama-prison?ref=collections.  
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Americans outside of prison that think they will never be jailed, Tenth 
Circuit Court Judge Alex Kozinski warns them, “You’re (probably) a 
federal criminal.”
8
 Due to the proliferation of criminal laws, the criminal 
“justice” system subjects virtually all Americans to the possibility of 
imprisonment for conduct that does not even come close to meriting 
imprisonment.
9
 Amid this chaos, a deep and fundamental question 
brews: Can the state justifiably coerce an individual to comply with its 
unjust laws? Even if the penalties for breaking unjust laws are life in 
prison or death? If not, then society’s stability is threatened. This article 
negotiates a middle position. The government is justified in enforcing 
unjust laws only if these laws are democratically enacted and are almost-
just. How much is almost-just? That depends on the kind of law at issue. 
Thus, lawmakers, prosecutors, and judges need to carefully distinguish 
crimes that directly affect only oneself, crimes that are violent, crimes 
that are primarily monetary-based, regulatory crimes, and others. To 
implement reforms, this article proposes new affirmative defenses for 
crimes, enhanced prosecutorial discretion, and more robust judicial 




Starting August 21, 2018, persons incarcerated across the United States 
have been striking back—non-violently.
10
 Inmates with jobs are protesting slave-
like wages through worker strikes and sit-ins.
11
 Even more surprisingly, many 
inmates have begun hunger strikes in their crusade.
12
  
The problems inmates face have long been noticed but inadequately 
addressed. Regarding mass incarceration, Americans go to jail 10.6 million times 
each year, and the majority of individuals in jail have not been convicted.
13
 In 
2011, in Brown v. Plata, the United States Supreme Court decided that 
overcrowding in California prisons constituted cruel and unusual punishment.
14
 
                                                          
8
 Alex Kozinsky & Misha Tseytlin, You’re (Probably) a Federal Criminal, in IN THE NAME OF 
JUSTICE: LEADING EXPERTS REEXAMINE THE CLASSIC ARTICLE “THE AIMS OF THE CRIMINAL 
LAW” 43 (Timothy Lynch ed., Cato Institute 2009). 
9
 Id.; THE ECONOMIST, supra note 7. 
10
 Sawari, Ware, & Incarcerated Workers Organizing Committee, supra note 1. 
11
 Lopez, supra note 2. 
12
 Sawari, Ware, & Incarcerated Workers Organizing Committee, supra note 1. 
13
 Peter Wagner & Wendy Sawyer, Mass Incarceration: The Whole Pie 2018, THE PRISON 
POLICY INITIATIVE (March 14, 2018), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/pie2018.html. This 
statistic counts as separate each time the same person goes to jail in a year. 
14
 Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493 (2011). 
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Shockingly, the inmate suicide rate in California has been almost double the 
national average, and a lack of access to basic health care has led to an average of 
one unnecessary death every week.
15
 While recent reforms have decreased some 
states’ prison populations, jail populations remain relatively unchanged.
16
 
In a 302-page ruling, in 2017, United States District Court Judge Myron 
Thompson revealed that, due to chronic, statewide overcrowding and 
understaffing, many Alabama prisons are “incredibly dangerous and out of 
control.”
17
 Judge Thompson found that the mental health care provided to inmates 
in Alabama was “horrendously inadequate.”
18
 He exposes how the mental health 
system continually fails in the way it screens, treats, and monitors inmates living 
with mental illness.
19
 Judge Thompson also lambastes Alabama Department of 
Corrections for its policies and practices regarding, among other things, imposing 
disciplinary sanctions on mentally ill prisoners for symptoms of their mental 
illness and placing seriously mentally ill prisoners in solitary confinement without 
adequately considering the impact of solitary confinement on their mental 
health.
20
 Sadly yet expectedly, the inmate suicide rate in Alabama has more than 
doubled in the prior two years.
21
  
Nationwide, from 2013 to 2014, the number of suicides among state 
prisoners increased by 30%, from 192 to 249 suicides in a year.
22
 In South 
Carolina, the number of inmates killed in the state’s prisons more than doubled in 
2017 from what it was in 2016 and quadrupled from 2015.
23
  
Due to all of these worsening trends, the recent non-violent strikes by 
persons incarcerated do not come as a surprise. Inmates are also protesting certain 
oppressive laws and the social and political problems that are rife in the criminal 
justice system. Specifically, their grievances include the following: 
1. racist sentencing practices;  
2. federal laws that enlarge mass incarceration; 
3. disenfranchisement of inmates and released convicts;  
                                                          
15
 Galvin, supra note 6.  
16
 Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Correctional Population Declined for the Ninth Consecutive 
Year (Apr. 26, 2018), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/press/cpus16pr.cfm.  
17
 Id. at 1193-1200. 
18
Anonymous & Schwartzapfel, supra note 7; Braggs v. Dunn, 257 F.Supp.3d 1171, 1268 (M.D. 
Ala. 2017). 
19
 Id. at 1267-68. 
20
 Id. at 1240-42, 1267-68. 
21
 Id. at 1200. 
22
 Matthew Clarke, Department of Justice Releases Reports on Prison and Jail Deaths, PRISON 
LEGAL NEWS  28  (Jan. 8 2018),  https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/news/2018/jan/8/depart 
ment-justice-releases-reports-prison-and-jail-deaths. 
23
 Lopez, supra note 2. 
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4. recent federal laws that make it more difficult for inmates to 
successfully sue prison officials for rights violations; and 
5. deficient rehabilitation programs in prisons.24 
Even though recent reforms have produced some decrease in mass incarceration, 
the current White House administration could likely stop this trend or drive it 
backwards. President Donald Trump’s and Attorney General Jeff Sessions’s 
statements and policies that call for increased mandatory sentences, cracking 
down on illegal immigrants, and aggressively enforcing drug laws could be the 
iron fist that breaks the back of an already collapsing prison system.
25
 Many, 
including judges currently sitting on the bench, believe that numerous unjust laws 




To those Americans outside of prison that think they will never be jailed, 
Tenth Circuit Court Judge Alex Kozinski warns them, “You’re (probably) a 
federal criminal.”
27
 Due to the proliferation of criminal laws, the criminal 
“justice” system subjects virtually all Americans to the possibility of 
imprisonment for conduct that does not even come close to meriting 
imprisonment.
28
 For example, federal agents arrested Mr. Norris, a 65-year-old 
importer of orchids for making a false statement to an undercover federal agent.
29
 
That federal crime is punishable by up to five years in prison.
30
 The agent had 
ordered some orchids from Mr. Norris, and a few of the orchids arrived without 
the correct paperwork.
31
 Mr. Norris had communicated, regarding the orchid 
shipment, with his Latin American suppliers, who were sometimes sloppy about 
the paperwork. So, Mr. Norris was also charged with conspiracy, and with it came 
another potential five-year prison sentence.
32
 Mr. Norris made at most $20,000.00 
                                                          
24
 Sawari, Ware, & Incarcerated Workers Organizing Committee, supra note 1; Lopez, supra 
note 2. 
25
 Galvin, supra note 6. 
26
 THE ECONOMIST, supra note 7; Timothy Head & Matt Kibbe, Too Many Laws Means Too 
Many Criminals, NATIONAL REVIEW  (May 21, 2015),  https://www.nationalreview.com/2015/05/ 
too-many-laws-means-too-many-criminals; Edwin Meese III, Too Many Laws Turn Innocents into 
Criminals, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION (May 26, 2010), https://www.heritage.org/crime-and-
justice/commentary/too-many-laws-turn-innocents-criminals; Anonymous & Schwartzapfel, supra 
note 7. 
27
 Alex Kozinski & Misha Tseytlin, supra note 8, at 43. 
28
 Id.; THE ECONOMIST, supra note 7. 
29
 Id.  
30
 Id.  
31
 Id.  
32
 Id.  
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per year by importing orchids.
33
 After legal bills exceeded his means, he 
reluctantly pled guilty and was sentenced to 17 months in prison.
34
 
In Virginia, Dr. William Hurwitz, who specialized in pain management, 
was sentenced to 25 years in prison for prescribing pills that a few of his patients 
resold.
35
 Contrast this harsh sentence with the Virginia board of medicine’s ruling 
that Dr. Hurwitz had acted in good faith.
36
 Nevertheless, he still served almost 
four years in prison.
37
  
As it stands, on the one hand, a bloated menagerie of criminal laws turns 
normal Americans into imprisoned felons. On the other hand, the abusive and 
exploitative prison system makes prisons horrendously harsh leading inmates to 
strike from work, go on hunger strikes, and even commit suicide. Amid this 
chaos, a deep and fundamental question brews: Can the state justifiably coerce an 
individual to comply with its unjust laws? Even if the penalties are life in prison 
or death? If these laws are not enforceable, then society’s stability is threatened.  
This article negotiates a middle position. Requiring certain laws to be 
completely just before government can justifiably enforce them is utopian. 
Instead, the government is justified in enforcing unjust laws only if these laws are 
democratically enacted and are almost-just. How much is almost-just? That 
depends on the kind of law at issue. Thus, lawmakers, prosecutors, and judges 
need to carefully distinguish crimes that directly affect only oneself, crimes that 
are violent, crimes that are primarily monetary-based, regulatory crimes, and 
others. In the end, the government is not justified in enforcing many of the current 
unjust criminal laws and unjust penalties. Some of these laws simply need to be 




Whether the state may justifiably coerce an individual to comply with its 
unjust laws primarily concerns injustice, rather than justice. How much injustice 
should we tolerate in a democratic society? An efficient and enlightening way to 




                                                          
33
 Id.  
34
 Id.  
35
 Id.  
36
 Id.  
37
 Id.  
38
 While such laws are still legally valid, the point is that good reasons support changing these 
laws or lessening their impact. 
39
 John Rawls’s theory of legitimacy can be found primarily in JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL 
LIBERALISM (1993) and John Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, in JOHN RAWLS: 
COLLECTED PAPERS 578 (Samuel Freeman ed., Harvard Univ. Press 1999). 
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Rawls contends that government is justified in enforcing a law if it is: 
1. supported by public reason, 
2. democratically enacted, and  
3. not-too-unjust.40 
The third criterion is key because it places a substantive requirement on a law’s 
legitimacy.
41
 If a law is too-unjust, then state coercion to enforce that law is 
invalid. Consequently, as long as the law is passed according to acceptable 
democratic procedures based in public reason, then Rawls argues that the state is 
justified in coercing individuals to comply with an unjust law provided it is not-
too-unjust.  
 While Rawls’s theory of legitimacy is attractive, this article contends that 
his theory needs to be more stringent. More specifically, a theory of legitimacy 
needs greater substantive constraints, especially for laws pertaining to criminal 
justice. The increased stringency that this article is advocating is that, in addition 
to the other requirements, to be legitimate a law must be almost-just instead of 
merely not-too-unjust.  
Additionally, a theory of legitimacy for law needs a companion theory of 
criminal justice, which forgivably Rawls does not provide. In demonstrating how 
a more stringent theory of legitimacy would apply to the extant legal system, this 
article focuses on crimes involving certain non-violent conduct that directly 
affects only the perpetrator due to the extreme human suffering that has resulted 
from such laws. To implement reforms, this article proposes new affirmative 
defenses for crimes, enhanced prosecutorial discretion, and more robust judicial 
review as viable mechanisms to legally invalidate or lessen the impact of laws and 
penalties that are not almost-just. 
 Section One explicates Rawls’s theory of legitimacy in more detail.
42
 
Section Two highlights aspects of Rawls’s theory of justice that are relevant to the 
issue of political legitimacy. Section Three argues for three main claims:  
1. State coercion that involves only money is less severe than state 
coercion that limits one’s freedom. 
2. The more severe the state coercion is the greater the justification for 
that coercion needs to be. 
3. Hence, most laws that limit liberty require greater justification than 
most laws that involve only money (“severity claim”). 
                                                          
40
 RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 39, at 128-29, 223-24. 
41
 Id. at 428-29. 
42
 I follow Rawls in only addressing legitimacy as it pertains to a democratic state. SAMUEL 
FREEMAN, RAWLS 324-26 (2007). Other kinds of states may require other theories of legitimacy. 
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These claims above are premises to argue for three more claims in Section Four. 
4. The not-too-unjust criterion may be sufficient to assess the legitimacy 
of a criminal law, the violation of which is punishable by only fines 
and restitution 
5. However, the not-too-unjust criterion is insufficient to assess the 
legitimacy of a law, the violation of which is punishable by 
incarceration. 
6. Hence, a theory of legitimacy needs to be more stringent by requiring 
(among other things) that a law, the violation of which is punishable 
by incarceration or worse, must be almost-just.
43
 
Analogizing in terms of letter grades, a just law earns an “A” grade. A not-too-
unjust law earns a “B” grade. An almost-just law earns an “A-” grade. As 
advocated here, a law must at least earn an “A-” grade for the law to be valid.  
A more stringent theory of legitimacy means that the state is not justified 
in enforcing many extant laws and penalties. To make this implication concrete, 
Section Five illustrates how implementing a more stringent theory of legitimacy 
would invalidate extant laws that criminalize certain non-violent conduct that 
directly affects only the perpetrator.  
Having completed the main argument, Section Six responds to a possible 
worry that making a theory of legitimacy more stringent threatens the stability of 
a society because, under such, the state may not justifiably enforce many of its 
laws. After dispensing with that concern, the conclusion comments on the impact 
of this article’s more stringent theory on the extant legal system.  
 
Section One: Rawls’s Theory of Political Legitimacy 
 Rawls’s theory of political legitimacy has many parts that address various 
purposes.
44
 The following exposition of his theory of legitimacy addresses only 
those aspects that deal directly with the motivating question: Can the state 
justifiably coerce an individual to comply with its unjust laws? Specifically, this 
section will not address how Rawls’s theory of legitimacy solves problems with 
his earlier argument for his theory of justice nor will it address how his theory of 
legitimacy provides its own (political) argument for what justice requires through 
an overlapping consensus. To state the focus differently, this article explores how 
unjust the laws of a society can be and still be legitimate—meaning that the state 
can coercively enforce the less-than-just laws. To that extent, instead of justice, 
                                                          
43
 Below I will flesh out how these technical terms indicate different requirements. Note that 
Rawls’s not-too-unjust requirement may delegitimize a law that limits one’s basic rights. 
44
 FREEMAN, RAWLS, supra note 42, at 324-25, 372. 
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this article focuses on the independent (though related) question of political 
legitimacy. 
 In focusing on state coercion of just and less-than-just laws, Rawls seeks a 
theory of social cooperation.
45
 Social cooperation involves “people more or less 
voluntarily engaging in activities and social relations according to terms of 
cooperation that they accept and regard as more or less fair, and from which 
everyone benefits in some manner.”
46
 Rawls’s point is that a society should be 
governed by reason rather than force.
47
 The whole point of constructing a theory 
of legitimacy then is to have a public justification for state action rather than 
merely making commands through laws and punishing violators without 
expecting those subject to the laws to be able to endorse the laws. State coercion 
is still part of a theory of legitimacy because one thing that requires public 
justification is the conditions under which state coercion may be used. To that 
extent, I am not trying to restructure Rawls’s theory into a modus vivendi as 
opposed to a theory of social cooperation that reasonable and rational people 
could endorse, although I focus on how to justify coercion of less-than-just laws. 
  To begin, we must clarify that state coercion should be considered 
broadly. State coercion means threatening penalties for violating the law as well 
as enforcing those penalties. State coercion also involves forcing a person to do 
something, such as when a bailiff physically removes an unruly, noncompliant 
person from a courtroom as well as forcing someone to pay a fine by garnishing 
her wages (before she receives them). State coercion includes the power to tax 
and the power to take away a person’s property. More subtly, the state can coerce 
individuals by taking away rights and privileges that they would otherwise have, 
such as when prisoners are denied the right to vote. Thus, when I use the concept 
of state coercion, I mean it in this broad sense, as I think Rawls does.
48
 
 In considering state coercion in this broad sense, we can usefully 
distinguish two aspects of coercion. The first aspect is the action that the state 
either requires or prohibits, usually through law.
49
 The second aspect is the 
                                                          
45
 I am not misinterpreting Rawls’s theory of legitimacy as a modus vivendi. RAWLS, POLITICAL 
LIBERALISM, supra note 39, at 146-47. For Rawls, a modus vivendi denotes a workable way of 
organizing a society—mostly through law and sanction—without basing its laws and sanctions on 
any process or reasons that citizens can reasonably accept. Id. at 146-49. Rawls is not after such a 
theory; he seeks a theory of social cooperation. Id. 
46
 RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 39, at 217; FREEMAN, RAWLS, supra note 42, at 
334. 
47
 RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 39, at 143. 
48
 Note that not every law is coercive in nature. H.L.A. Hart emphasizes that some laws do not 
have penalties and some laws bestow benefits and rights. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW, 
chapter 3 (1961).  
49
 I mean the distinction between laws that require action and those that prohibit action to be 
merely illustrative of how law affects individuals rather than a fundamental distinction. 
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penalty the state enforces against those who refrain from doing the required 
conduct (e.g. paying taxes) or those who act in the prohibited way (e.g. rape). 
Included in the second aspects are penalties for not complying with the state’s 
attempt to enforce other penalties (e.g. a longer prison term for escaping from 
prison). Examples of penalties are: fines, community service, performance of 
specific actions (like returning stolen property), imprisonment, and even death.
50
 
These two aspects of state coercion are important to keep in mind because they 
can be different kinds of coercion. For example, the state can coerce its citizens 
by requiring that they pay a tax on their income. The state can coerce the 
individual who does not pay the required income tax by fining him or putting him 
in prison. Both the income tax and the penalty for its violation are two (separable) 
aspects of state coercion. 
  Rawls intends his theory of legitimacy to apply to both aspects of state 
coercion that I have identified: the law and the sanction for its violation.
51
 
However, Rawls does not insist that every law must meet his theory of 
legitimacy.
52
 Instead, Rawls argues that his theory of legitimacy definitely applies 
to “constitutional essentials” of the legal system and questions of “basic justice,” 
leaving open the application to other areas of law.
53
 By constitutional essentials, 
Rawls means two aspects of the legal system:  
a. fundamental principles that specify the general structure of 
government and the political process… 
b. equal basic rights and liberties of citizenship that legislative majorities 
are to respect: such as the right to vote and to participate in politics, 
liberty of conscience, freedom of thought and of association, as well as 
the protections of the rule of law.
54
  
I think Rawls would include in constitutional essentials whether the society 
protects the rights in the United States Constitution that play a large role in the 
criminal justice system such as the right against self-incrimination and the right 
against cruel and unusual punishment, although Rawls is unclear on this point.
55
 
Such are plausibly part of a society’s “equal basic rights and liberties of 
                                                          
50
 I omit corporal punishment (aside from the death penalty) since democratic states no longer 
use it. In terms of my classification, I would consider corporal punishment as part of liberty 
coercion because the penalized cannot choose to forego the corporal punishment. Torture is also 
liberty coercion. 
51
 FREEMAN, RAWLS, supra note 42, at 182. 
52




 Id. at 227. 
55
 Id. at 218 (mentioning some of the constitutional rights pertaining to criminal procedure 
without explicitly tying them to what he refers to elsewhere as constitutional essentials). But see 
id. at 232. 
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 Below I will argue that we should also include in constitutional 
essentials all core parts of criminal justice. For now, Rawls means his theory of 
legitimacy to apply at least to constitutional essentials (outlined above) and basic 
justice (provided by his theory of justice as fairness).
57
  
 For laws involving the constitutional essentials and basic justice to be 
legitimate, Rawls believes that laws must meet three criteria. Legitimate laws 
must be supported by public reasons; they must be passed through an acceptable 
democratic procedure; and they must be not-too-unjust.
58
 I will explicate each of 
these criteria in turn. 
 First, for a law to be legitimate, Rawls argues that the law must be 
supported by a public reason.
59
 Rawls conceives of public reason as the kinds of 
reasons, inferences, and evidence that a society uses to deliberate about its laws.
60
 
Rawls exemplifies what he means by public reason through the way the U.S. 
Supreme Court usually defends their decisions.
61
 The Supreme Court does not 
(usually) employ controversial religious, moral, philosophical, or scientific 
doctrines in how it usually reasons through its decisions.
62
 Instead, the Court 
(usually) employs reasons including rules of inference and evidence that “all 
citizens as reasonable and rational might reasonably be expected to endorse.”
63
 




 From the example of the Supreme Court, we learn that public reasons 
must not be controversial religious, moral, philosophical, or scientific reasons.
65
 If 
reason is a public reason, then it counts (even minimally) in the public 




 Id. at 228-29. 
58
 While these ideas are Rawls’s ideas partially filtered through Samuel Freeman’s work, 
FREEMAN, RAWLS, supra note 42, the presentation of them in this way is my creation. I provide 
textual support for each requirement below. 
59
 RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 39, at 223-24; see also FREEMAN, RAWLS, supra 
note 42, at 379.  
60
 RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 39, at 212-13, 223-24. 
61
 Id. at 231-40. The Court does not always exclusively use public reason. FREEMAN, RAWLS at 
384. An infamous example is Justice Bradley’s concurring opinion in Bradwell v. State of Illinois, 
83 U.S. 130 (1873), where he states, “[t]he natural and proper timidity and delicacy which belongs 
to the female sex evidently unfits it for many of the occupations of civil life....The paramount 
destiny and mission of women are to fulfill the noble and benign offices of wife and mother. This 
is the law of the Creator.” Id. at 142. Fortunately, at least in recent history, the Supreme Court 
does not (usually) employ nonpublic reasons, such as controversial religious, moral, philosophical, 
or scientific doctrines, in how it reasons in its decisions. 
62




 Id. at 240. 
65
 FREEMAN, RAWLS, supra note 42, at 404-05. 
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 Even if a public reason is not decisive on whether to enact a law, 
most everyone can reasonably acknowledge that the reason counts (even 
minimally) for or against a possible law.
67
 
 Since public reasons do not include or rely on controversial religious, 
moral, philosophical, or scientific beliefs, then virtually all citizens can 
reasonably endorse these reasons despite their particular worldview 
(‘comprehensive doctrine’ in Rawls’s words).
68
 Rawls calls this phenomenon 
“overlapping consensus.”
69
 Individuals with different and conflicting religious, 
moral, philosophical, and scientific beliefs can come to a consensus about laws 
when they only employ public reason since public reason excludes the 
controversial beliefs about which individuals disagree.
70
 Using public reason for 
public deliberation fosters social stability because what can cause deep divisions 
among citizens (controversial beliefs) is excluded from the discussion about the 
law.
71
 By excluding controversial beliefs from the law making process, Rawls 
thinks that a democracy can be stable for the right reasons over time because 
everyone can reasonably affirm the reasons supporting the laws.
72
 While the 
concept of public reason itself has more to it than I have stated, for brevity’s sake, 
I turn to how public reason applies to the issue of legitimacy,  
Rawls contends that a law cannot be legitimate unless supported by public 
reasons.
73
 For example, the state cannot require that all individuals serve in the 
military for the reason that doing so helps individuals draw closer to God. The 
reason “serving in the military draws one closer to God” contains several 
controversial religious and philosophical beliefs. Instead, the state may be able to 
require that all individuals serve in the military (for a period) for the reason that 
universal military service would strengthen the country’s ability to defend itself in 
times of war and emergency. Not everyone would agree that a law requiring 
universal military service was a good idea. However, virtually everyone could 
reasonably endorse that the reason behind the law— universal military service 
would strengthen the country’s ability to defend itself in times of war and 
emergency—counts (even minimally) in favor of the law. This reason along with 
the implicit idea that strengthening the country’s defense is a reasonably good 
goal to pursue are public reasons that could be used to support a law requiring 
universal military service. To the extent that a law is supported by one or more 
                                                          
66
 Id. at 405-06. 
67
 As evident in Freeman’s discussion of abortion and public reason. Id. at 406-09. 
68
 RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 39, at 226. 
69
 Id. at 150. 
70




 FREEMAN, RAWLS, supra note 42, at 390-93. 
73
 RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 39, at 217. 
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 Not every possible law supported by public reasons should become a law; 
some possible laws are better than others. Instead of assessing the strength of 
public reasons directly, Rawls relies on a democratic procedure (the second 
requirement) to choose among the possible laws supported by public reasons.
75
 
“Democratic decisions and laws are legitimate, not because they are just but 
because they are legitimately enacted in accordance with an accepted legitimate 
democratic procedure.”
76
 Without democratic endorsement, the law is not 
legitimate. 
 Rawls is not too specific on what democratic endorsement involves, 
though he requires that it be a procedure that “all may reasonably accept as free 
and equal when collective decisions must be made and agreement is normally 
lacking.”
77
 He imagines a process where the society debates the merits of laws 
through “critical and informed deliberation among equals.”
78
 Such a deliberation 
only allows public reasons to count for or against a law.
79
 The process allows 
voting in some way based on what individuals think is the best law based only on 
the relevant public reasons.
80
 While Rawls envisions citizens voting (at least for 
representatives), Rawls does not require a participatory democracy—where every 
citizen actively participates in the law making process.
81
 Since I do not intend to 
take issue with this democratic requirement of Rawls’s theory of legitimacy, I will 
let the brief remarks I have made suffice. 
 Finally, the third requirement for a law to be just in Rawls’s theory is a 
substantive requirement, which I refer to as the “not-too-unjust requirement.”
82
 
                                                          
74
 Due to Rawls’s unclarity, when I say “one or more,” I am interpreting Rawls to some extent. 
75
 FREEMAN, RAWLS, supra note 42, at 403. 
76
 RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 39, at 428. Deliberative democratic endorsement 
is a requirement of a legitimate law, in part, because deliberative democracy is essential to public 
reason. FREEMAN, RAWLS, supra note 42, at 404.  
77
 RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 39, at 428.  
78
 Samuel Freeman, Deliberative Democracy: A Sympathetic Comment, 29 PHIL. AND PUBLIC 




 RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 39, at 216-20. I omit a discussion of the duty of 
civility because it seems to point us to the requirements of public discussion about laws. While 
important, I am focusing instead on how laws that have been passed impact individuals punished 
for violating those laws. For clarity, I keep the ideas separate. 
81
 Freeman, Deliberative Democracy, supra note 78, at 378-79. 
82
 I call it “substantive” (as Rawls does in POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 39, at 428-29) to 
distinguish it from the other two requirements of legitimacy even though Rawls’s theory of justice 
as fairness is itself a procedural theory of justice. 
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Rawls requires, “laws cannot be too unjust if they are to be legitimate.
83
 Rawls 
does not provide much more content to this vague requirement except to say that 
“laws that clearly violate the basic liberties are then neither just nor legitimate, 
and should have no legal or political authority.”
84
 Freeman characterizes the not-
too-unjust requirement in terms of the laws needing to be “moderately” just.
85
  
Making this substantive requirement specific enough to apply to actual 
laws necessitates that I interpret (to some extent) Rawls’s vague not-too-unjust 
requirement, given other aspects of Rawlsianism. Since I am arguing that this 
substantive requirement needs to be more stringent, much of what I will argue 
below attempts to make the substantive requirement more specific. I do so by 
trying to draw some brighter lines about what would constitute a law being not-
too-unjust.
86
 Despite vagueness, the general idea Rawls has in mind should be 
understandable. 
 The role the third requirement plays in relation to the other two 
requirements is important. The requirements of public reason and democratic 
endorsement do not assess the substance of the law directly. In Rawls’s words, 
“the outcomes of a legitimate procedure are legitimate whatever they are. This 
gives us purely procedural democratic legitimacy and distinguishes it from 
justice.”
87
 Specifically, the public reason requirement pertains to the kinds of 
reasons offered without assessing their merit. The democratic endorsement 
requirement relies on a procedure to produce substantively good laws. Only the 
not-too-unjust requirement assesses directly the substance of the laws 
themselves.
88
 Due to its function, I often refer to this requirement as the 
“substantive requirement.” Since I am concerned about the substantive injustice 
that can result even when the public reason and the democratic endorsement 
requirements are satisfied, I focus mainly on making the substantive requirement 
more stringent. 
Recall, the purpose of Rawls’s theory of legitimacy that I am focusing on 
is to tell us when state coercion is justified to enforce laws, even when the laws 
                                                          
83
 RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 39, at 429. The requirement is not only vague but 
is also “undetermined.” Id. at 428. “Legitimacy allows an undetermined range of injustice that 
justice might not permit.” Id.  
84
 FREEMAN, RAWLS, supra note 42, at 376. One qualification to this point is that, at places, 
Rawls allows basic liberties to be limited in order to strengthen the overall protection of basic 
liberties. 
85
 Id. at 377. 
86
 I do not pretend to give the range of injustice permitted by legitimacy; I draw some 
meaningful lines. 
87
 RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 39, at 428. 
88
 “Neither the procedures nor the laws need be just by a strict standard of justice, even if, what 
is also true, they cannot be too gravely unjust. At some point, the injustice of the outcomes of a 
legitimate democratic procedure corrupts its legitimacy.” Id. 
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are less-than-just. Rawls also has two related goals that focus on how citizens 
regard the law. First, Rawls aims to provide with his theory of legitimacy reasons 
why citizens should have general respect for political authority.
89
 Closely related, 
the second goal is to show that citizens (and those within the ambit of the society) 
have a duty to obey the law.
90
 These two goals relate to the main purpose (I focus 
on) of the justifiability of state coercion in the following way. If laws are 
legitimate according to Rawls’s theory, then individuals in that state have a duty 
to respect and obey the laws and the state is justified in coercing individuals to 
obey the laws, including punishing those who violate the law. 
The two goals of general respect and the duty to obey suggest that Rawls 
is trying to justify a general obligation to obey the law.
91
 The alternative would be 
to provide a theory that would examine whether each individual has a duty to 
obey each particular law. This alternative kind of theory directs us to assess the 
obligation to obey a law each individual at a time, assessing each law one-by-
one.
92
 I think that Rawls is not doing either of these options in his theory of 
legitimacy despite the appearance that he wants to justify a general duty to obey 
all laws. Instead, he is doing something in between these two options. Although I 
have not space for a full defense of my interpretation of Rawls on this point, I 
think what Rawls aims to do is provide us with a theory that can be applied to 
particular laws to assess their legitimacy. The assessment is not specific to 
individuals like the alternative extreme above; if a law is legitimate, it is 
legitimate as far as everyone in the society is concerned. At the same time, Rawls 
seems to hope that his theory will show that enough of the laws in most 
democracies are legitimate such that individuals in these societies will have 
general respect for political authority. Furthermore, if Rawls’s theory shows that 
most laws are legitimate, then the general perspective or the prima facie position 
that individuals should take is that they have a duty to obey the law. This prima 
facie duty to obey the law is defeasible, but defeasing it requires persuasive 
argument. To that extent, Rawls thinks his theory of legitimacy provides a duty to 
obey the law where exceptions may occur but would be rare.
93
 
Rawls concerns himself with general respect for political authority and the 
duty to obey the law along with the justifiability of state coercion because he is 
                                                          
89
 In part because the law-making process affirms their political autonomy. FREEMAN, RAWLS, 
supra note 42, at 400-01. 
90
 Id. at 377. 
91
 Rawls advocates a general obligation to obey law based on the duty of fair play. John Rawls, 
Legal Obligation and the Duty of Fair Play, LAW AND PHILOSOPHY: A SYMPOSIUM (S. Hook ed., 
New York Univ. Press 1964). See also A. John Simmons, The Duty of Fair Play, 8 PHIL. AND 
PUBLIC AFFAIRS 307 (1979). 
92
 Joseph Raz offers such an individualist theory of the duty of obey the law (a theory of 
“political authority” in Raz’s terms). JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM (1986). 
93
 Rawls suggests such in RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 39, at 393. 
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worried about social stability.
94
 Rawls thinks that a theory of justice is not an 
adequate theory unless it can provide for social cooperation that is stable (for the 
right reasons) over time.
95
 Since any society is bound to have some laws that are 
unjust due to the difficulty of democratic political processes and the imperfect 
abilities of humans (‘“imperfect procedural justice”’), Rawls’s theory of 




Without social stability, a society with less-than-just but legitimate laws 
cannot incrementally improve its laws to achieve greater justice. Without stability, 
the democratic processes that can improve laws may be disrupted and any social 
discord may stunt the society’s progress toward justice. Even worse, if societies 
with less-than-just but legitimate laws cannot maintain stability, they may lose the 
degree of justice that they have obtained falling into greater injustice or social 
chaos. To justify avoiding greater injustice, the ultimate aim of Rawls’s theory of 
legitimacy is to show that a less-than-just but legitimate society is justified in 
using state coercion to maintain stability and that citizens have a duty to obey the 
less-than-just and the just laws to foster stability.  
As I mentioned above, the main worries about my argument for increased 
stringency in standards for legal legitimacy is that such undercuts social stability. 
While I argue that this worry has little force, I now prepare for my argument by 
highlighting how Rawls’s theory of legitimacy relates to aspects of his theory of 
justice as fairness.  
 
Section Two: Highlighting Rawls’s Ideal Theory of Justice 
 To prepare for my argument, I must highlight a couple aspects of Rawls’s 
theory of justice as fairness.
97
 Rawls’s theory of justice is important because 
Rawls develops his theory of legitimacy in contrast to his theory of justice.
98
 
Thus, to understand fully his theory of legitimacy we must understand certain 
aspects of his theory of justice.  
 The first important point to highlight is that Rawls’s develops his theory of 
justice within a theoretical construct that Rawls calls “ideal theory.”
99
 (When I am 
referring to Rawls’s theory of justice, I mean primarily those aspects that justify 
                                                          
94
 FREEMAN, RAWLS, supra note 42, at 410. 
95
 RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 39, at 38, 140-43, 391. 
96
 FREEMAN, RAWLS, supra note 42, at 377. 
97
 JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE: REVISED EDITION 18-19 (1999); JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE 
AS FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT (Erin Kelly ed., Harvard Univ. Press 2001) [hereinafter RAWLS, 
JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS]. 
98
 RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 39, at 428. 
99
 Or, “strict compliance theory.” RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE: REVISED EDITION, supra note 
97, at 8-9. 
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and explain his two principles of justice. I am not referring to the stages in his 
theory where the assumptions of ideal theory are relaxed.) Ideal theory makes 
particular simplifying assumptions. One important simplifying assumption that 
Rawls makes in his theory of justice is that he assumes that “everyone is 
presumed to act justly and to do his part in upholding just institutions.”
100
 To that 
extent, ideal assumes that individuals generally comply with the laws.
101
 For this 
reason, Rawls calls ideal theory “strict compliance theory.”
102
  
 Rawls sees strict compliance as an important assumption to make in 
constructing a theory of justice. A reason why strict compliance is important to 
Rawls is that he wants to construct a theory of justice that is grounded in the legal 
apparatus of a society.
103
 So, assuming that all people will obey the laws is 
tantamount to assuming that people will follow his theory of justice. Rawls wants 
to assume that people will follow his theory of justice because he thinks that how 




 My aim is not to fully explicate, defend, or critique Rawls’s use of strict 
compliance theory. Instead, I am pointing out this feature of Rawls’s theory of 
justice to show how it should relate to Rawls’s theory of legitimacy. 
 From Rawls’s use of ideal theory including his assumption of strict 
compliance with the law, we can notice the second aspect of Rawls’s theory of 
justice. Rawls’s theory of justice does not include a complete theory of criminal 
justice.
105
 By a theory of criminal justice, I mean to include a theory of criminal 
procedural rights (What procedures must the state follow in enforcing criminal 
and regulatory laws?), a theory of criminalization (What should be criminalized?), 
and a theory of punishment (How and how much criminal acts should be 
punished?). Other areas of laws are also left out by Rawls’s assumption of strict 
compliance such as regulatory law, which at present in the U.S. straddles criminal 
law and administrative law.
106
 While Rawls’s assumption of strict compliance 
occludes other important areas of law (e.g. tort law), I focus on the four areas I 
have mentioned: criminal procedural rights, criminalization, punishment, and 
regulation. These four areas of law (that Rawls leaves out) deal with how society 
                                                          
100
 Id. at 8. 
101
 Id. at 245. 
102
 Id. at 8, 245. 
103
 Id. at 7. The “basic structure” is essentially what I am referring to here without the Rawlsian 
jargon. 
104
 Id. at 9; see also RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 39, at 143-44, 284-85. 
105
 Rawls is aware of this lack. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE: REVISED EDITION, supra note 97, 
at 8-9, 575. Perhaps, a partial theory of penalties exists even in ideal theory, but Rawls does not 
provide it for us. Id. at 241. 
106
 Such is implicit in Id. at 241. Again, a partial theory (not given by Rawls) may be required 
for ideal theory. 
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should treat those who do not comply with the law. In sum, since Rawls assumes 
strict compliance with the law, his theory of justice as fairness does not address 
how to deal with instances where individuals do not comply with the law. 
 Rawls intentionally omits the theories that I am highlighting.
107
 I am not 
criticizing Rawls’s theory of justice for its use of ideal theory, its assumption of 
strict compliance, or its omission of theories of criminal justice and regulatory 
law. However, once we leave Rawls’s theory of justice and move to his theory of 
legitimacy, we also need to leave the realm of ideal theory, abandoning the 
assumption of strict compliance.
108
 
 The reason why we need to abandon ideal theory is that a theory of 
legitimacy is a question most relevant in non-ideal theory. The essence of the 
question of legitimacy is as follows: how far can we depart from justice with state 
coercion still being justified? Since the society does not achieve complete justice 
in its laws, something along the way has gone wrong, as it seems that it inevitably 
must go wrong in actual human practices.
109
  
 An objector may argue that while working out a theory of legitimacy, we 
could still maintain the assumption of strict compliance. All individuals could still 
be assumed to obey both just and unjust-but-still-legitimate laws. Thus, even 
though we are allowing something to go wrong such that full justice is not achieve 
in the laws, we can still assume strict compliance with the laws. 
 In response, perhaps we could work out a partial theory of legitimacy with 
the assumption of strict compliance. However, we cannot work out a full theory 
of legitimacy without eliminating the assumption of strict compliance. As long as 
we assume strict compliance, the need for the criminal law is not fully 
appreciated. In particular, a theory of criminal procedural rights would be largely 
undeveloped under strict compliance because the procedure would not be used. 
Thus, to have a complete theory of legitimacy for the real world, we need to 
construct a theory of legitimacy outside of ideal theory—where the assumption of 
strict compliance is abandoned.
110
 
 Another aspect of Rawls’s theory of justice that is important to my 
argument is the priority relationship between his principles of justice. Instead of 
addressing this issue here, I will highlight it below where it figures into the 
argument. To begin that argument, I now turn to the role stability plays in Rawls’s 
theory of legitimacy. 
 
                                                          
107
 Id. at 8-9, 575.  
108
 FREEMAN, RAWLS, supra note 42, at 324-25, 379. 
109
 Id. at 377. 
110
 Id. at 324-25, 379. 
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Section Three: More Severe State Coercion Requires Greater 
Justification  
 Recall that Rawls is interested in constructing a theory of legitimacy for 
state coercion because he is concerned about the stability of the government and 
the society over time. While a just society is preferable to an unjust society, Rawls 
does not want a society to be unstable if its laws do not completely meet Rawls’s 
standard of justice. Rawls seems resigned to the possibility that no society can be 
completely just.
111
 Rawls does not want the lack of justice in a society to lead to 
instability, law-breaking, and/or revolution, at least as long as the lack of justice is 
not that much. 
 To avoid instability, law-breaking, and/or revolution, the state often 
employs coercion. State coercion (including credible threats) can incentivize 
individuals to comply with the law.
112
 Thus, through coercion, a state can 
maintain stability. For Rawls, the state’s use of coercion must be justifiable. 
Rawls believes that coercion is justifiable to uphold just laws and just institutions. 
However, Rawls’s theory of legitimacy is aimed at showing when coercion is 
justifiable to uphold laws that are less-than-just.  
 One reason Rawls needs a theory of legitimacy is due to the publicity 
requirement of his theory of justice. Rawls requires that his theory of justice is 
publicly known and hopefully publicly endorsed.
113
 If what is just is publicly 
known and the laws fail to meet that standard of justice, the people may become 
discontent. Such discontentment may lead to instability. So, Rawls adds his theory 
of legitimacy to his theory of justice to deal with the problem of stability that may 
result from a society failing to meet its publicly known standard of justice.
114
 
 Recall, the theory of legitimacy aims at showing when the laws are 
justifiably enforced even if they are less-than-just. If the laws are legitimate even 
if they are less-than-just, then individuals should respect political authority and 
individuals have a duty to obey the law. While Rawls recognizes that a just 
society is the ideal, a less-than-just society can still be worthy of respect by its 
citizens who are duty bound to obey the law, and that less-than-just society is 
justified in perpetuating itself even through coercion. The hope is that a legitimate 
though less-than-just society can be stable so that it can become increasingly just. 
Without stability, a less-than-just society may face revolution rather than 
                                                          
111
 Id. at 377. 
112
 RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE: REVISED EDITION, supra note 97, at 241. 
113
 RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS, supra note 97, at 120-122. 
114
 See FREEMAN, RAWLS, supra note 42, at 352-353 for a related point. 
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incremental progress toward justice; without stability, a less-than-just society is 
unlikely to achieve greater justice.
115
 
 While I agree that state coercion is necessary to maintain the stability of a 
legal system and a society in general, Rawls’s theory of legitimacy is insufficient 
to justify state coercion in the criminal law. This claim is my main thesis.  
 To begin my defense of that thesis, note that the state uses various kinds of 
coercion. The kinds of coercion vary from taxation to fines to community service, 
to a deprivation of privileges or rights (e.g. the privilege to drive and right to vote) 
to parole to probation to imprisonment to death. These categories are different 
kinds of coercion rather than different degrees of coercion along a spectrum 
because they affect an individual along different dimensions. For my purposes, I 
do not need hard distinction between taxation and fines.
116
 I am making the 
modest distinctions: taxation is different in kind from imprisonment and the death 
penalty. More generally, the modest distinction is between state coercion that 
affects individuals monetarily and state coercion that affects individuals in terms 
of their liberties.  
State coercion that affects individuals monetarily is primarily taxation and 
fines. I will refer to these mechanisms as “monetary coercion.” State coercion that 
affects individuals in terms of their liberties is community service, imprisonment, 
and death.
117
 I will refer to these mechanisms as “liberty coercion.” Imprisonment 
is the central example of liberty coercion because it is a common punishment and 
it is a substantial infringement on a person’s liberty. When I speak of liberty 
coercion from now on, I primarily have imprisonment in mind.  
It is true that all laws that command or prohibit action affect one’s liberty; 
taxing an individual deprives that person of the liberty to spend the amount of 
money taxed as she wishes. This characteristic cuts across my distinction between 
monetary and liberty coercion. However, I think the modest distinction is still 
meaningful in that liberty coercion, whether in the law itself or the penalty of any 
law, involves a deprivation of a basic liberty. Monetary coercion decreases one’s 
liberty to use one’s money, but using all of one’s (pre-tax) money as one wishes is 
not a basic liberty.
118
 
                                                          
115
 I am not sure if Rawls specifically makes this point, but I think it consistent with his views 
even if legitimacy (or justice) is never completely obtainable. 
116
 In practice, fines and taxation are difficult to distinguish. Fines are usually associated with 
legal violations while taxation is not, but fines impact a person much like taxation. Though their 
theoretical justification may vary, the practice of taxation and fines may be more similar than 
different.  
117
 I group community service with liberty coercion because the person penalized with 
community service must do some action; he cannot (legally) buy his way out or pay someone else 
to do it.  
118
 RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 39, at 227-230. 
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 I do not think the distinction between monetary and liberty coercion is that 
controversial. Another way to view the distinction is that monetary coercion does 
not restrict an individual's legal freedom (aside from what the law itself requires) 
while liberty coercion does restrict an individual's legal freedom. By legal 
freedom, I mean one's freedom to do what most citizens can do without legal 
restriction.  
When one's legal freedom is restricted, the state prohibits a person from 
going certain places or doing certain things. (I distinguish below “legal freedom” 
from “actual freedom” the latter being what one can actually do.) Monetary 
coercion does not restrict a person's legal freedom because she can still go where 
she wants and do what she wants as most citizens are able to do provided she has 
the means (monetary or otherwise) to facilitate her action. Liberty coercion does 
restrict a person's legal freedom in that the state prohibits a person from going 
where she wants and doing what she wants (to some extent) no matter how much 
money or resources she may have. For example, an imprisoned individual cannot 
legally leave the prison, ceteris paribus, without permission regardless of how 
much money she has. The person may still be actually free to do as she wants; 
nevertheless, she is legally prohibited from doing so. 
 The distinction is based on legal freedom (not actual freedom) because 
some individuals will still be able to do what they want (actual freedom) because 
they are able to violate the governmental prohibition. Also, money talks. Some 
rich individuals are able to circumvent governmental restrictions of their legal 
freedom through illegal mechanisms such as bribes. Nevertheless, even if these 
individuals’ actual freedom is not restricted as much as the government has 
required, their legal freedom is still restricted because their going beyond the 
governmental prohibition is illegal.  
 I take it I have said enough so far to make the distinction between 
monetary coercion and liberty coercion plausible.
119
 Instead of developing the 
distinction further, I turn to its implications for Rawls's theory of legitimacy. 
 The implication of the distinction between monetary coercion and liberty 
coercion has to do with the justification for each kind of coercion. Since liberty 
coercion is more severe than monetary coercion, the justification for instances of 
liberty coercion must be stronger than the justification for instances of monetary 
coercion. By “severe,” I mean to refer to how burdensome coercion is and how 
important the coercion-limited liberty is.  
 To clarify, I am not claiming that all instances of liberty coercion are more 
severe than all instances of monetary coercion. We need to keep in mind that both 
monetary and liberty coercion come in degrees. Fines and taxes can be large or 
                                                          
119
 Rawls makes a similar distinction for a different purpose. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE: 
REVISED EDITION, supra note 97, at 314. 
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small. Moreover, prison terms can vary from a day to a lifetime. For some people, 
a large fine may be more severe than a weekend in jail. However, for most people 
most of the time, monetary coercion is not as severe as liberty coercion.  
Not only do I not need a stronger claim than the generalization in “most-
claim” for the remainder of my argument, but I only need the claim that some 
instances of liberty coercion are more severe than monetary coercion. I argue 
below that as laws involve increasingly severe coercion, these laws require 
increasingly stringent justification (compared to the laws involving less severe 
coercion). Consequently, my argument can be individualized to how each law 
affects each individual. However, for simplicity and because I believe the more 
general “most-claim” holds, I treat the claim in terms of the categories “liberty 
coercion” and “monetary coercion” instead of a spectrum.  
Many reasons support the generalization that most instances of liberty 
coercion are more severe than most instances of monetary coercion; I mention 
only a few. First, since democracies have dispensed with debtor’s prison, laws 
involving only monetary coercion do not lead to liberty coercion.
120
 Second, in 
democratic societies with a welfare system, monetary coercion in the form of 
taxes has a limit; the depth of one’s wallet. Those who are the worst off are often 
taxed very little or are even subsidized through redistributive payments from the 
taxes of others. Since fines also have a monetary impact, they too can be offset by 
redistributive payments from a welfare system. Nevertheless, for most people 
while taxation and fines affect them monetarily, the severity of this infringement 
is not as severe as liberty coercion.  
 The third reason why liberty coercion can be more severe than monetary 
coercion results from extant conditions in prison. Brutal violence including rape 
takes place in many prisons, often committed by the prison guards.
121
 Moreover, 
much of the prison population comprises people living with mental disabilities, 
racial minorities, and the poor. The preponderance of these groups in the prison 
population suggests that the criminal justice system unduly disfavors already 
vulnerable groups. Thus, liberty coercion can excessive harm vulnerable groups 
including the impacts that it has on the imprisoned’s family, especially their 
dependents.  
The final reason (I mention) that liberty coercion is more severe than 
monetary coercion concerns the after-effects of imprisonment. After being 
imprisoned, often a social stigma haunts one leading to social ostracism from 
one's family, friends, neighbors, and acquaintances. The social stigma can also 
                                                          
120
 Of course, the poor can be subject to liberty coercion if they cannot afford criminal fines. Yet, 
such pertains to criminal fines not taxation.  
121
 DOUGLAS HUSAK, OVERCRIMINALIZATION: THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 5 (2008). 
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impede acquiring a job or other social benefits such as adopting children.
122
 In 
contrast, monetary coercion—even when it takes the form of a criminal fine—
often does not have as bad of a social stigma attached to it. 
 Due to the social stigma attached to liberty coercion and the way the 
welfare system ameliorates some of the effects on the poor of monetary coercion, 
most instances of liberty coercion are more severe than most instances of 
monetary coercion. Aside from these two reasons, the intuitive point that most 
people would rather pay a fine than go to jail also makes it plausible that for most 
people liberty coercion is more severe than monetary coercion.  
Once again, I am not insisting that all instances of liberty coercion are 
more severe than all instances of monetary coercion for all people. My claim 
pertains to what is generally true for most people. In most cases, liberty coercion 
is more severe than monetary coercion. Furthermore, not only do I not need a 
stronger claim than this “most-claim” for the remainder of my argument, but the 
rest of my argument only needs the claim that some instances of liberty coercion 
are more severe than monetary coercion. I argue below that as laws involve 
increasingly severe coercion, these laws require increasingly stringent 
justification (compared to the laws involving less severe coercion). Consequently, 
this claim can be individualized to how each law affects each individual.  
 I have given some intuitive plausibility to: the distinction between liberty 
coercion and monetary coercion; and the claim that liberty coercion is often more 
severe than monetary coercion. I turn now to how these points suggest that liberty 
coercion requires greater justification for its legitimacy than does monetary 
coercion.  
Since more severe coercion is more burdensome to those coerced, we 
would expect that the more severe coercion is the greater the justification must be 
for the coercion. Combining this point with the distinction between monetary and 
liberty coercion, most laws that involve liberty coercion require greater 
justification than most laws that involve only monetary coercion. I will call this 
claim the “severity claim.”  
By a “greater justification” in the severity claim, I mean several things. (In 
fleshing out this concept, I also am providing intuitive reasons for the severity 
claim.) One thing that is included in “greater justification” relates to the quality of 
the purpose of the law. The more severe the coercion, the more worthy the 
purpose of the law should be. For example, we punish the crime of murder with 
life in prison or the death penalty because protecting innocent lives is a highly 
worthy purpose. Since a person's life is irreplaceable and the most valuable asset 
one has, punishing anyone who murders with a severe punishment such as life in 
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prison is arguably justified. In contrast, life in prison for petty theft is unjustified 
as the legacy of Les Miserables indicates.
123
 
I am not arguing for the details of how to punish particular crimes. I am 
making the more general intuitive claim: since most instances of liberty coercion 
involve more severe coercion, we expect the purpose of such laws to be 
proportionally more worthy of achieving. I refer to this aspect of “greater 
justification” in the severity claim as the “proportionality constraint.” 
 Another aspect of the “greater justification” that we want included the 
severity claim has to do with our confidence about the justification of the law. Not 
only do we want the proportionality constraint satisfied, but we also want to be 
confident about our beliefs about the worthiness of the law’s purpose. Confidence 
comes in degrees. For example, we may think that unauthorized downloading of 
music on the internet should be illegal, but we may not be confident about how 
bad such a crime is. Perhaps, we would be comfortable with a modest fine for 
downloading music, perhaps a civil remedy on top of the modest fine. But, given 
the likely benefits for the artist and music industry of unauthorized downloading, 
we may not be confident enough to punish such a crime with heavy fines. We 
most likely would be unwilling to incarcerate someone over music downloading, 
not just because of the proportionality constraint, but also because we may not be 
that confident that we know just how bad of a crime music downloading is. Due 
to this issue of confidence, the greater the severity of coercion, we want to be 
more confident that the crime is worthy of punishing. In that sense, we want more 
justification the greater the severity of coercion.  
 Other considerations go into what I mean by “greater justification” in the 
severity claim. I will explore one of these in detail below. Mentioning it briefly, 
we want greater procedural safeguards the more severe the kind of coercion as 
indicated by many of constitutional rights dealing with how the state may enforce 
the criminal law.  
  All of the reasons I have given so far are supposed to support the claim 
that we have an intuition that due to their greater severity, most instances of 
liberty coercion require greater justification than most instances of monetary 
coercion (severity claim). I am not sure that I want to go so far as to say that the 
severity claim is a considered conviction in the Rawlsian sense, although I think it 
comes close.
 124
 Let me now turn to some contractarian and specifically some 
Rawlsian reasons supporting the severity claim. 
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 The general contractarian reason supporting the severity claim has to do 
with the persuasiveness of the arrangement to be contracted. If individuals are 
going to agree to a social contract, they need to be persuaded that one particular 
contract is superior to any other social contract. My claim is that a social contract 
that requires greater justification for the state to use liberty coercion than with 
monetary coercion will be more persuasive or appealing of an arrangement to the 
contractors than a social contract that requires the same moderate level of 
justification for all kinds of state coercion.
125
  
 This contractarian claim is meant to apply to most forms of 
contractarianism as long as the contractors doing the reasoning are situated 
roughly fairly.
126
 Since all fairly-situated contractors would consider the chance 
that they or someone they care about could be accused of a crime, whether 
justifiably accused or not, most if not all contractors would want the justification 
(in my sense) of liberty coercion to be greater than monetary coercion, due to the 
greater severity of liberty coercion. The reason they would find the severity claim 
persuasive is that that they are risking being subjected to more suffering if they 
agree to a society with liberty coercion as opposed to a society that only uses 
monetary coercion. (I am assuming that the contractors would want the more 
severe liberty coercion to deter people from committing the core crimes.) Thus, to 
balance off the increased risk of suffering the more severe liberty coercion, social 
contractors would want each law involving liberty coercion to satisfy more 
stringent standards of justification than the standards applied to laws involving 
only monetary coercion. 
 I do not think I am begging the question in my general contractarian point. 
Like Rawls, I am using a contractarian apparatus to flesh out the reasoning of 
individuals who situated roughly fairly.
127
 Instead of developing the general 
contractarian point, I turn to a reason for the severity claim that is specific to 
Rawlsianism. 
 In Rawls’s two principles of justice, the first principle protects the basic 
liberties of individuals while the second principle relates directly to the monetary 
arrangement between individuals.
128
 I need not go further into the details of the 
two principles; my point pertains to the relationship between Rawls’s two 
principles of justice. 
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 The relationship I am referring to is the priority of the first principle over 
the second principle. Part of Rawls’s theory is that a society must satisfy the first 
principle first before it satisfies the second principle.
129
 Perhaps more accurately 
for non-ideal theory, a society cannot improve its adherence to the second 
principle by lessening its adherence to the first principle.
130
 The essential idea in 
the priority of the first principle over the second principle is that a society is 
unjust if it pursues greater wealth (even according to the difference principle) 
when doing so leads to the equal basic liberties being achieved to a lesser extent. 
Put simply, a society cannot pursue wealth by sacrificing equal basic liberties 
among all citizens.  
Rawls allows basic liberties to be traded-off against one another as long as 
doing so is necessary to ensure equal basic liberties for all.
131
 By implication, 
Rawls may be committed to the possibility that even some individuals’ equal 
basic liberties may be drastically limited, at least in the short term, in special 
circumstances where doing so is necessary to preserve the whole system of basic 
liberties such as when the government faces overthrow. In sum, Rawls allows 
basic liberties to be traded-off against other basic liberties in some cases. 
However, Rawls does not allow equal basic liberties to be traded off for greater 
monetary gain even when the greater monetary gain accords with the second 
principle of justice. 
 From this brief explanation of the priority of the first principle over the 
second, I want to draw support for the severity claim. Given the priority of basic 
liberties over monetary gain in the priority Rawls builds into his two principles of 
justice, we would expect a similar sort of distinction when it came to the state 
taking away an individual’s basic liberties versus the state taking away a person’s 
money. We expect such because to have basic liberties and money, an individual 
needs both the state to provide institutions to provide for basic liberties and 
monetary pursuit and the state needs to refrain from taking away one’s basic 
liberties and too much of one’s money.  
 More specifically, with liberty coercion, the state is taking away a 
person’s basic liberty to freedom of association and freedom of movement (often 
in addition to other liberties such as rights of political participation). Rawls prizes 
freedom of association and freedom of movement highly among the basic 
liberties.
132
 Thus, liberty coercion is severe in that it deprives an individual some 
of her most important basic liberties. 
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 In contrast, while taking away a person’s money is still coercion, I argued 
above monetary coercion is often not as severe as taking away a person’s basic 
liberties. Back to Rawls, he attaches differential importance to the basic liberties 
over greater wealth in the priority Rawls gives to the first principle over the 
second principle. From this differential importance, we can infer that, in Rawls’s 
view, the basic liberties are more important than greater wealth (assuming 
subsistence is met). Applying this aspect of Rawls’s theory of justice to state 
coercion, we find support for the premise of the severity claim: liberty coercion is 
(often) more severe than monetary coercion.  
 Assuming I am right about Rawlsian commitments, we would expect 
Rawls to treat laws that involve liberty coercion differently from laws that involve 
monetary coercion. The differential treatment need not involve some sort of 
priority of one over the other because we do not need to trade-off one kind of 
coercion for the other. Instead, I am proposing that the differential treatment 
should be the severity claim: laws that threaten the deprivation of the basic 
liberties (liberty coercion) need greater justification than the laws that only 
threaten individuals’ monetary situation (monetary coercion).  
 In summary, Rawls’s theory of justice supports the severity claim. Due to 
the priority of the principle that protects the basic liberties over the principle 
concerned with wealth distribution, we see that Rawls finds basic liberties more 
important than greater wealth. To that extent, we would expect Rawls to agree 
that state coercion that deprives individuals of basic liberties is more severe (in 
most cases) than state coercion that deprives individuals of a portion of their 
money (assuming subsistence). If so, then the severity claims follows. The 
“greater justification” required by the severity claim is analogous to the priority 
that Rawls attaches to the first principle over the second. Since preserving equal 
basic liberties is so important, the state should have greater justification for laws 
that threaten to deprive individuals of those basic liberties than for laws that 
involve only monetary coercion. 
 Since the points I have made so far figure into my argument in the next 
section, I will be returning them below. Let it suffice for now that I have made 
plausible two claims (including support from Rawls’s theory of justice). First, 
liberty coercion is more severe than monetary coercion in most cases. Second, due 
to its greater severity, most laws involving liberty coercion require greater 
justification than most laws involving only monetary coercion (severity claim). In 
the next section, I will argue that the severity claim indicates that Rawls’s theory 
of legitimacy needs to be more stringent for it to properly assess the legitimacy of 
laws that involve liberty coercion. 
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Section Four: Legitimate Liberty Coercion 
 In this section, my main objective is to develop the points from above to 
suggest that Rawls's theory of legitimacy needs to be more stringent when 
assessing laws involving liberty coercion. To begin, recall, Rawls’s theory of 
legitimacy is supposed to show how the state may acceptably use coercion to 
enforce the law. Enforcing the law is important because, according to Rawls, 
enforcing the law is necessary to maintain stability of a society over time.
133
  
Of course, Rawls does not want a law enforced regardless of its merit.
134
 
Rawls’s theory of legitimacy is supposed to tell us which less-than-just laws may 
still be justifiably enforced. Recall that for Rawls, laws have to meet the three 
requirements: supported by public reason, endorsed democratically, and not-too-
unjust. Thus, as long as the laws meet these three requirements, states can 
justifiably enforce their laws, even if some laws are less-than-just, to ensure social 
stability.  
The question is whether Rawls’s three requirements (public reason, 
democratic endorsement, and not-too-unjust) for a law to be legitimate are 
adequate to the task of justifying the use of state coercion. I am not sure how to 
decisively answer this question. In this paper, I want to make a more modest claim 
that while the legitimating requirements Rawls uses may be sufficient for laws 
involving monetary coercion, it is dubitable that these legitimating requirements 
are sufficient for at least some laws involving liberty coercion. In other words, I 
contend that Rawls’s requirements for legitimacy are not stringent enough for 
laws involving liberty coercion. Note, how much is “enough” is always hard to 
measure. I hope to stack up the reasons so that the case for making Rawls’s theory 
of legitimacy more stringent for laws involving liberty coercion is more 
persuasive than leaving the theory as it is.  
 First, I want to grant for the sake of argument that Rawls’s requirements of 
legitimacy (public reason, democracy, and not-too-unjust) are enough to justify 
laws that involve only monetary coercion.
135
 While I do not defend this claim, I 
will offer one reason why I think Rawls theory of legitimacy may justify laws 
involving only monetary coercion to contrast why his theory does not justify laws 
involving liberty coercion.  
 One reason why Rawls’s theory of legitimacy may be sufficient to justify 
the laws involving monetary coercion results from the substantive requirement 
that the laws be not-too-unjust. While I stated above that this requirement is 
vague, I do not think it is hopelessly vague. One minimal standard Rawls draws 
from this requirement is that the law cannot put individuals below subsistence 
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(while others are above subsistence).
136
 Hence, for Rawls, if individuals are below 
subsistence, the society is too unjust.  
 Requiring that laws involving monetary coercion (taxation and fines) does 
not put an individual below subsistence is a reasonable requirement for a law’s 
legitimacy. As long as one is at or above subsistence, one can make use of one’s 
basic liberties to a meaningful extent. Since many of life’s meaningful activities 
do not require more wealth than subsistence, especially with many state-provided 
goods such as libraries, parks, and museums, a person with subsistence can live a 
minimally decent if not meaningful life. Hence, Rawls’s requirement that the laws 
involving monetary coercion does not put one below subsistence is reasonable to 
assess their legitimacy. At least, such is granted. 
 In contrast to monetary coercion, Rawls’s theory of legitimacy is not 
stringent enough to assess the legitimacy of laws involving liberty coercion. I 
think the main requirement that is not stringent enough is the not-too-unjust 
requirement. To see why I focus on this substantive requirement, let me point out 
how the public reason and democratic endorsement requirements do not 
necessarily prevent unjust laws.  
Above I pointed out that Rawls’s theory of legitimacy does not directly 
use the strength of public reasons directly to justify the legitimacy of a law. At 
most, the strength of a public reason only plays a role indirectly in the democratic 




Since Rawls’s theory of legitimacy does not directly use the strength of 
public reasons to justify the legitimacy of a law, then it is possible that laws that 
involve liberty coercion can be legitimate (according to Rawls) even if the laws 
are supported by only weak public reasons. By weak public reasons, I am 
referring to the reasons in favor of the law being either weak in themselves or 
weak compared to the reasons against the law. 
 Given the severity of many instances of liberty coercion, it is at least 
surprising that Rawls thinks that laws that involve liberty coercion can be made 
legitimate even supported by only weak public reasons. Below I will argue it is 
more than surprising but actually problematic for Rawls’s theory. I will also 
develop some examples of laws that are at best supported by weak public reasons 
but are arguably illegitimate. As a preview, these laws are those that prohibit 
certain non-violent conduct such as laws against drugs and prostitution. The 
essence of these examples is that weak public reasons support them, yet they are 
illegitimate, at least in so far as liberty coercion is used to enforce them.  
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Before we get to these examples, let’s not forget that laws supported by 
weak public reasons still have to be democratically endorsed and the substance of 
the law itself must be not-too-unjust. Nevertheless, these two additional 
requirements are not stringent enough for Rawls’s theory of legitimacy to justify 
laws involving liberty coercion.  
Consider first the democracy requirement. It is possible that laws 
supported by only weak public reasons can be passed democratically. 
Representative democracies are infamous for such laws when legislators vote 
swap, make pork-barrel laws, and follow the fervent of the masses. Direct 
democratic law-making can also make laws based on weak public reasons when 
the masses are biased, misinformed, fooled by propaganda, mesmerized by 
celebrities, selfish, incited by extreme events, and so on.  
If the law passed democratically is not supported by any public reasons, 
then that law is not legitimate according to Rawls’s theory of legitimacy. But, as 
long as the democratically endorsed law is supported by a public reason, even if 
weak in itself or weak compared to the countervailing public reasons, then that 
law meets the public reason requirement and the democratic endorsement 
requirement of Rawls’s theory of legitimacy. So, the democracy requirement of 
Rawls’s theory of legitimacy does not guarantee that laws only supported by weak 
public reasons will not be enacted. 
The extent to which the not-too-unjust requirement delegitimizes a law is 
complicated. I mentioned above that despite the vagueness of the not-too-unjust 
requirement, we could safely assume that monetary coercion would be too-unjust 
if it made an individual fall below subsistence. Unlike this fixed point with 
monetary coercion, the not-too-unjust requirement is harder to pin down with 
liberty coercion. I am not claiming that liberty coercion will always fail to meet 
the requirement of being not-too-unjust. Life in prison for vandalism is clearly 
too-unjust. Yet, less obvious is what is too unjust in cases not so extreme. Life in 
prison may or may not be too-unjust for murder; intuitions among people and 
across cultures will vary on such issues. For example, the U.S. has prison terms 




My guess is that many individuals have moderate to strong intuitions 
about the appropriate punishment for murder, though these intuitions differ 
among people and across cultures. However, I think our intuitions are less strong 
with other severe crimes such as rape. Is ten years in prison too-unjust for rape? 
When it comes to other crimes that do not involve physical harm such as white 
collar crime, robbery, and tax evasion our intuitions about what is too-unjust are 
even weaker. Some empirical data suggests that Americans ordinally rank the 
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severity of core crimes similarly.
139
 Yet, attaching specific prison terms to each 
crime has been more judicial art(ifice) than science. 
The problem of vagueness in the not-too-unjust requirement sketched in 
the preceding paragraph indicates the beginning of a solution. I mentioned in 
section two that Rawls’s theory of justice lacks a companion theory of criminal 
justice (i.e., theory of criminalization, theory of punishment, and a theory of 
regulation). A companion theory of criminal justice would help mitigate the 
vagueness of the not-too-unjust requirement because we would see, more clearly, 
what justice requires regarding liberty coercion. I say “companion” theory 
because Rawls’s theory of legitimacy need not create its own theory of criminal 
justice. Rather, it needs a theory of criminal justice to draw upon for the not-too-
unjust requirement to have any actual content pertaining to liberty coercion.  
To be fair to Rawls, he may have had in mind a theory of criminal justice 
included in his not-too-unjust requirement. To my knowledge, Rawls does not 
clarify this point. Regardless, I think I have demonstrated the need for a theory of 
criminal justice in order for Rawls’s theory of legitimacy to apply to large 
sections of the legal system including the penalties for any law. To that extent, we 
should read Rawls’s theory of legitimacy as assuming a substantive requirement 
for constitutional essentials, basic justice, and criminal justice. 
The extent of my thesis is not merely Rawls’s theory of legitimacy needs 
to include a theory of criminal justice. While I think that emphasizing the need for 
a theory of criminal justice is an important addition to Rawls’s theory of 
legitimacy, I think it is not enough to deal with the concerns I have raised. Once 
we see the need for a theory of criminal justice, Rawls’s theory of legitimacy 
needs to be made more stringent.  
The increased stringency consists in greater scrutiny of the substance of 
laws and their penalties especially when such involve liberty coercion.
140
 The 
tricky question is how much more stringent do laws involving liberty coercion 
need to be compared to laws involving only monetary coercion. I will try to draw 
such a distinction. I call the more stringent version of the substantive requirement 
to replace Rawls’s not-too-unjust requirement the “strong version.”  
 
Strong version: for most laws involving liberty coercion to be legitimate 
the laws and their penalties must be almost-just.  
 
How much more just is almost-just than Rawls’s not-too-unjust is obviously a 
hard distinction make. Recall the analogy to letter grades. Rawls’s theory of 
                                                          
139
 PAUL H. ROBINSON, DISTRIBUTIVE PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW: WHO SHOULD BE 
PUNISHED HOW MUCH 11 (2008). 
140
 There are other ways to make Rawls’s theory of legitimacy more stringent, which I omit. 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3254058 
 
 
Page 31 of 54 
Gregory Jay Hall 
 
legitimacy requires that a law earn a “B” grade (not-too-unjust). The strong 
version requires an “A-” grade (almost-just) for the law to be legitimate.  
Put differently, by almost-just, I mean that the laws can only be a hair’s 
breadth below justice. To put the distinction in other words, almost-just means 
that the laws are just, plus or minus a small margin of error. Once again, if we had 
a persuasive theory of criminal justice, the distinction between almost-just and 
not-too-unjust would be easier to make. In lieu of having such a theory, below I 
identify some fixed points where we can meaningfully distinguish the strong 
version from Rawls’s moderate version. 
Before doing so, I use the severity claim to defend the strong version. 
Recall, since liberty coercion is often very severe, we would expect greater 
justification for imposing liberty coercion than we do for monetary coercion 
(severity claim). The severity claim supports (something like) the strong version 
because the strong version requires a higher standard of justice for laws involving 
liberty coercion.  
Since the severity claim supports the strong version, the Rawlsian reason 
in favor of the severity claim also supports the strong version. The importance of 
this reason merits repeating it quickly. From the priority Rawls gives to the first 
principle, we can infer that the protection of equal basic liberties is more 
important for Rawls than incremental greater wealth beyond subsistence. Since 
the protection of equal basic liberties is more important, most laws involving 
liberty coercion require greater justification than most laws involving only 
monetary coercion.  
 The strong version is also supported by the intuitive point that leads to the 
severity claims. Most forms of punishment involving liberty coercion are quite 
severe. With imprisonment in particular, we are depriving the imprisoned the 
freedom to self-regulate basic aspects of his life such as what, when, and where he 
eats. The imprisoned are controlled and governed in ways that livestock are 
governed, even though most of the imprisoned still have some basic rights such as 
the right to life. To justifiably subject a person to such a severe punishment as 
imprisonment, the laws should be just or, at least, almost-just. Using such severe 
coercion as imprisonment without the relevant law and its penalty being almost-
just seems indefensible. 
 A further point in support of the strong version comes from the U.S. 
Constitution. We have evidence that the beliefs embodied in U.S. Constitution 
endorse the strong version. As I mentioned earlier, the U.S. Constitution has 
stringent requirements that the criminal justice system must meet in order to 
inflict a punishment on an individual. The rights to trial by jury, habeas corpus, 
non-self-incrimination, no double jeopardy, and only reasonable searches and 
seizures are some of procedural requirements that the state must meet in using 
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coercion to enforce a law. In contrast, the right against cruel and unusual 
punishment is substantive requirement of the criminal law.  
In many instances, if one or more of the criminal procedural requirements 
are not met, the Constitution forbids convicting and punishing the accused to any 
extent. For example, if the state obtained all of the evidence against the accused 
via unreasonable searches and seizures, then the evidence would be inadmissible 
and the accused would be neither convicted nor punished. These stringent 
constitutional rights governing the procedures for enforcing the law indicate that, 
to a large extent, we would rather err on the side of not punishing some violators 
of the law rather than administer punishments through an unjust procedure. Since 
these constitutional procedural protections are highly valued and, in many ways, 
most U.S citizens take them for granted, they seem to be considered convictions 
or approaching such. 
 These constitutional rights concerning the procedure for enforcing the law 
are likely to be part of a persuasive theory of criminal justice. It is this theory of 
criminal justice that I pointed out is missing from Rawls’s theory of legitimacy. 
Since we seem committed to not using liberty coercion unless the procedural 
rights in the Constitution are met, I want to extrapolate from that to the whole 
theory of criminal justice needed in Rawls’s theory of legitimacy.  
 If we are not willing to use liberty coercion because we value the 
procedural rights in the Constitution, then we should similarly be unwilling to use 
liberty coercion if other aspects of a persuasive theory of criminal just are not also 
met. Perhaps, not every minute aspect of a theory of criminal justice would be so 
important to override the legitimacy of a law involving liberty coercion. However, 
at the core aspects of the theory of criminal justice will be that important such that 
not meeting them will delegitimize the law and its enforcement. Consequently, 
the rights protected in the Constitution are not the only aspects of a theory of 
criminal justice that would need to be met to avoid delegitimizing a law involving 
liberty coercion. Rather, many other aspects including principles on what can be 
criminalized and how and to what extent can the violation of criminal laws be 
punished, the substantive constitutional right against cruel and unusual 
punishment being one of them. While I will not defend the claim here, I think that 
the substantive aspects of criminal justice are just as important, if not more 
important, than the procedural rights of criminal justice protected in the 
Constitution.  
All of the arguments I have given so far for increasing the stringency of 
Rawls’s theory of legitimacy for laws involving liberty coercion support the 
strong version of the substantive requirement. The main reasons are as follows:  
1. Liberty coercion involves a more severe form of coercion than 
monetary coercion 
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2. The greater the severity of coercion, the greater the need of 
justification for a law. 
3. Liberty coercion as a punishment involves a severe deprivation of 
basic liberties. Hence, we must have strong reasons to deprive 
individuals of their basic liberties. 
4. Many Constitutional rights require procedural criminal justice for the 
state to justifiably punish. Similarly, substantive criminal justice 
should be (at least) almost met before the state can justifiably punish 
with liberty coercion. 
I think I have said enough about these four reasons to make them plausible. 
Instead, of developing them further I want to illustrate some ways that the strong 
version would delegitimize extant laws that Rawls’s theory may not delegitimize.  
 
Section Five: Delegitimizing Certain Non-violent Criminal Laws 
 One difficulty with Rawls’s theory of legitimacy, which I mentioned 
previously, is the vagueness of the not-too-unjust requirement. I do not claim to 
have solved this difficulty. Until we have a persuasive theory of criminal justice 
to add to Rawls’s theory of justice as fairness, vagueness still remains to some 
extent even with the strong version of the substantive requirement. In this section, 
I hope to combat some of this vagueness by identifying a fixed point in the realm 
of criminal justice where we can gauge how the strong version (compared to 
Rawls’s moderate version) of the substantive requirement would evaluate part of 
the extant criminal law in the United States. 
 As I mentioned in passing above, certain existing criminal laws violate 
criminal justice. One illuminating set of examples pertain to certain non-violent 
crimes such as drug use and prostitution. I aim to argue that Rawls’s theory of 
legitimacy, as it stands, justifies the extant criminalization of such conduct. 
Furthermore, this justification of criminal sanctions against such conduct 
should trouble us. As a solution, I contend that the strong version of the 
substantive requirement that I am proposing would not justify the extant troubling 
laws pertaining to such conduct. To that extent, we should prefer that the strong 
version of the substantive requirement replace Rawls’s not-too-unjust 
requirement. 
 To begin my argument, “self-regarding” conduct is one way of 
characterizing the conduct I have in mind. The problem with that term is that most 
conduct can and does affect other people. Not all conduct does. My favorite is 
example is scratching my leg when no one else is around. Such scratching clearly 
need not affect other people, although we could imagine bizarre circumstances in 
which it did.  
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Nevertheless, the types of criminalized conduct, which I am targeting, in 
the extant law can and often do affect other people. The point of the conduct, with 
which I am taking issue, is not that such conduct does not ever affect other 
people. Rather, the point is that in their direct effects, they only affect the person 
performing the conduct. If such conduct affects other people, they do so 
indirectly. By indirectly I mean that, in most instances, such conduct affects the 
person performing the conduct (directly) and then the person who was affected 
directly may do something that affects another person as a result of the direct 
effects of the “self-regarding” conduct. These indirect effects of “self-regarding 
conduct” are worth distinguishing from the direct effects because the indirect 
effects may not happen, vary greatly among people, are often separated from the 
direct effects by a significant stretch of time, and can often be 
ameliorated/avoided by planning or third-party intervention. Without a more apt 
term, I reluctantly use “self-regarding conduct” as I have just explained. 
 To illustrate, consider an argument that people opposed to drug use often 
employ to contend that drug use is not self-regarding. They contend that drug use 
causes child neglect and/or abuse (child abuse, for short).
141
 Set aside the fact that 
not all drug use causes child abuse since not all drug use leads those who have or 
are around children to abuse them. Let’s grant the minimal claim that at least 
some people who use drugs end up abusing their children some of the time in part 
because of the drug use. 
 Even granting such a minimal claim, the drug use that leads to child abuse 
is still self-regarding conduct. The direct effect of the drug use is an alteration of 
the psychological state of the person who ingests the drug. This psychological 
effect on the person using the drug is a direct effect. In certain circumstances for 
certain people, the psychological effect of the drug on the user will lead that 
person to abuse a child. However, the child abuse is an indirect effect. The abuse 
of the child only resulted because of certain circumstances obtaining such as the 
child being present after the drug was ingested and the child abuse could have 
been avoided by planning to have the child in another location or under the care 
of another competent adult who could protect the child. Even if one is not 
convinced that drug use is self-regarding conduct, the concept is still cogent 
because there are other examples of clearly self-regarding conduct that has been 
criminalized in the past such as masturbation, homosexual sex, and sodomy. 
Once again, I am not mounting a thorough defense of the concept of self-
regarding conduct. I hope what I have said has explicated the concept of self-
regarding conduct along with making the concept plausible. From now on, I will 
assume that the concept of self-regarding conduct is coherently applied to the 
examples use.  
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One further clarificatory point concerning self-regarding conduct is that 
self-regarding conduct need not involve only one person. Some of the above 
examples involve more than one person such as prostitution. Conduct involving 




Once again, for illustrative purposes, prostitution can have indirect other-
regarding effects—both positive and negative. Prostitution can have positive 
indirect other-regarding effects in that by fulfilling a person’s basic sexual needs, 
in reducing that person’s stress, and in providing companionship to the lonely, 
that person may be better able to meet other people’s needs and function better at 
work. At the same time, prostitution can have negative indirect other-regarding 
effects such as causing conflict and even violence between married people and 
transmitting disease. Even with these possible positive and negative indirect 
effects, prostitution is still a self-regarding conduct because the direct effect of the 
conduct in terms of physical sensation only affects the prostitute and the 
customer.  
With these clarificatory remarks, I offer some reasons why if we amend 
Rawls’s theory of legitimacy to include the strong version of the substantive 
requirement, laws involving liberty coercion that criminalizes self-regarding 
conduct would be illegitimate. To make this claim, let me first say why I think 
that Rawls’s theory of legitimacy, as it stands, would justify some of the extant 
laws against self-regarding conduct. 
Many extant laws criminalizing self-regarding conduct meets Rawls’s 
three requirements of legitimacy.
143
 This result of Rawls’s theory of legitimacy 
should trouble us because these extant laws are troubling. I will use the drug laws 
as the primary example to make this claim, even though a similar argument could 
be made with other criminalized self-regarding conduct such as prostitution and 
gambling. While states are starting to modify laws against drug possession, the 
reform is by no means complete.
144
 Additionally, criminal laws against drug 
production and trafficking are in force in the entire United States. I will refer to all 
of these laws as “drug laws.”
145
 
Drug laws meet the public reason requirement of Rawls’s theory of 
legitimacy. Some of the public reasons in favor of drug laws are as follows: drugs 
harm physical and mental health; drugs involve destructive addictions. I think 
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these are weak public reasons in both senses that I stipulated above; the public 
reasons themselves are weak and the countervailing public reasons against drug 
laws are strong.  
For example, the claims about the ill effects of drugs are overstated. What 
is especially grossly exaggerated (most notably in popular opinion) is the 
incidence of drug addiction among drug users. The popular idea that drug use 
always leads to drug addiction is a myth.
146
 Another exaggeration is the difficulty 
of going through withdrawal. A reliable description of heroin withdrawal has 
likened it to the unpleasantness of a moderate flu; such does not seem that bad.
147
 
Since many think drug withdrawal is intensely painful, the extent of withdrawal is 
also exaggerated. 
I am not denying that drugs can destroy some people’s health and lead to 
some deaths. I am also not denying that overcoming drug addiction is hard and 
that drug addiction can lead people to destroy their relationships and employment. 
However, many of these negative aspects of drug use could be ameliorated 
through education on how to use drugs safely and through medical care for those 
who have become addicted. These ameliorative programs are either too few or not 
sought after largely because of the drug laws themselves. Quite possibly, if the 
drug laws were repealed the negative effects drugs have on many people’s lives 
would be substantially mitigated. Keep in mind though, as I mentioned above, 
drugs do not always have negative effects on people’s health. For these reasons, 
public reasons in favor of drug laws exist, but are weak. 
Let me quickly note that one of the main reasons that people in favor of 
the drug laws offer in support of them is not a public reason. James Q. Wilson, 
former head of the National Advisory Council for Drug Abuse Prevention, states, 
“Cocaine alters one’s soul.”
148
 Wilson and others claim that drug use is so 
immoral that it must be criminally prohibited.
149
 They do not offer much more 
explanation of their moral claim beyond stating it. I am merely flagging that this 
moral claim is not a public reason because it depends on highly controversial 
moral beliefs that are not widely held. 
In addition to the public reasons supporting drug laws being weak in 
themselves, the countervailing public reasons against the drug laws are strong. 
The strongest public reasons have to do with the freedom to manage one’s own 
body and health. While this public reason is moral in nature, it is so universally 
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accepted, at least in the abstract, that it is not controversial. Just the opposite. This 
commitment to freedom in one’s body and health is presupposed by the 
commitment to allow people to pursue, even minimally, a diversity of lifestyles 
and conceptions of the good (freedom to eat what one wants).  
There are some controversial exceptions to the nearly universal 
commitment to freedom in one’s body and health. The most notable exception is 
abortion. But note that abortion has a direct effect on another living entity. 
Therefore, for most people who oppose abortion, it is not self-regarding conduct 
since they assume that the other living entity, the fetus, is not consenting to the 
abortion. To that extent, it seems that the freedom for a person to manage her 
body or health is only challengeable when it conflicts with the life of another 
(purported) person (and even this limitation is controversial).  
Another controversial exception to the commitment to freedom to one’s 
body and health is the legal limitation on how one can end one’s own life. For 
brevity, suffice it to say while the right to die is still controversial, the actual 
practice of medicine in hospice care and with living wills indicates that attitudes 
about how much control individuals should have over their death seem to be 
changing.
150
 The change is in the direction of giving individuals and their families 
more freedom over their body and their health even when it comes to their own 
death. Since the freedom to manage one’s body and health is a widely recognized 
freedom, this freedom counts as a public reason against drug laws.  
Another public reason against drug laws contends the exact opposite of the 
main public reason in favor of drug laws. While for some people drugs can have 
negative effects on their health, for others just the opposite is the case. Using 
drugs helps their physical and mental health.
151
 Marijuana is the best known drug 
for possibly having healing properties not found in even prescription drugs.
152
 
Heroin has obvious palliative uses.
153
 Aside from these specific cases, a more 
general point can be made. Drugs make people feel good; that is one major reason 
people use them. To the extent that drugs make people feel good, people receive 
benefits at least to their mental health.
154
 Better mental health can spill over to 
physical health as well as other areas of one’s life. Remember many people use 
drugs without addiction or any of the horror stories that the “War on Drugs” 
campaign portrays as imminent. 
                                                          
150
 Telephone Interview with Dr. M. Nathan Starr, D.O., Physician, Intermountain Healthcare 
(July 16, 2009). 
151
 ROBERT J. MACCOUN & PETER REUTER, DRUG WAR HERESIES: LEARNING FROM OTHER 




 Id. at 197. 
154
 Interview with Stephen J. Morse, supra note 147. 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3254058 
 
 
Page 38 of 54 
Judicious Imprisonment 
From the analysis above, we can conclude that there are public reasons on 
both sides of the controversy over the drug laws. Since Rawls’s theory of 
legitimacy does not assess the strength of public reasons, having merely some 
weak public reasons in favor of the drug laws is sufficient to meet the requirement 
of public reason. Therefore, Rawls’s theory of legitimacy does not allow us to 
evaluate the public reasons for and against drug laws to determine whether the 
drug laws are legitimate.  
Moving on, I will not spend time arguing that the extant drug laws have 
satisfied the democratic endorsement requirement of Rawls’s theory of 
legitimacy. The fact that they have been passed through an arguably democratic 
process and that most of the citizenry support them should suffice to establish that 
the extant drug laws have been democratically endorsed.
155
 Instead, I will just 
reiterate that Rawls relies on the democratic process (and perhaps implicitly J.S. 
Mill’s “marketplace of ideas”) to correctly assess the strength of public reasons 
and balance out the public reasons for and against a law.
156
 If the democratic 
process does not do this assessment and balancing correctly, the only check 
against unjust laws that Rawls’s theory legitimacy has is in the third requirement 
concerning the substance of the law.
157
 
Turning to that substantive requirement, determining whether the drug 
laws are too-unjust is difficult because of the reasons already stated: the 
vagueness of the standard and the lack of a complete theory of criminal justice. 
Nevertheless, the majority of Americans seem to think that the drug laws are 
roughly just, exceeding Rawls’s requirement of that laws be not-too-unjust.
158
 I 
will contest this point later. But, it is an interesting social phenomenon that so 
many Americans think that the drug laws are just.  
Of course, a minority of Americans think the drug laws are unjust. Yet, 
this minority has not been able to garner enough political momentum even to 
bring the drug laws under serious reconsideration. One success in modifying the 
drug laws has been a change from incarcerating those convicted of drug 
possession to requiring those convicted to go into a drug rehabilitation 
program.
159
 This change in the form of punishment has likely been motivated by 
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the prisons being overcrowded.
160
 In other words, the change in sentencing for 
drug possession may have resulted from the practical problems of the penal 
system rather than a burgeoning awareness that criminalizing drug possession is 
unjust. The overwhelming majority of Americans who think the drug laws are just 
lends some support to the minimal claim that drug laws may be not-too-unjust. 
Some reasons support that extant drug laws are not-too-unjust given their 
actual impact in their current context. In other words, the drug laws are part of a 
social system with both formal and informal parts that combine to cause many 
social ills. Since they are a part of a social system that would be worse, at least in 
the short run, without the drug laws, the drug laws may not be too-unjust. Let me 
clarify what I mean. 
Drug laws interact with a complex system of drug production, drug 
trafficking, and drug use. Currently, the drug production, trafficking, and use 
causes or reinforces many social problems including organized crime, gang 
warfare, spreading disease, violence, and exploitation of racial minorities, women, 
the poor, and children. Even though the drug laws and the war on drugs in general 
have created or exacerbated many of these social ills, eliminating the drug laws 
altogether in a short period may make these social ills along with other public 
health concerns worse. To decriminalize drugs without making the status quo 
worse, the legal change would have to be incremental and accompanied by many 
programs in education and public assistance to help transition the status quo to a 
legal regime where drugs are legal.
161
  
Since we have neither these programs nor the political will to create them, 
the drug laws may be necessary to avoid an even greater social disaster than they 
have currently created. In an ironic sense, the American social system is 
“addicted” to the drug laws. The system is not willing to “quit” the drug laws 
through well-funded programs, and the sudden “withdrawal” from the drug laws 
may be more unjust than the status quo. Thus, given the current social system and 
political climate in which the drug laws function, the drug laws may not be too 
unjust. 
Even though the drug laws (as well as other criminalized self-regarding 
conduct such as prostitution and gambling) may be not-too-unjust given the 
current social contexts in which they function, I do not think these laws are 
almost-just, especially when violators are punished with liberty coercion. In other 
words, even considering the social context of extant laws that criminalize self-
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regarding conduct, these laws fail the strong version of the substantive 
requirement because they are not almost-just.  
To begin, I first will say briefly why criminalizing self-regarding conduct 
through liberty coercion is unjust. After doing so, I will give some reasons why 
drug laws in particular and laws criminalizing self-regarding conduct in general 
are not almost-just—even considering their social context.  
The main reasons why justice requires the freedom to engage in self-
regarding conduct are similar to the reasons I gave above concerning why liberty 
coercion is a severe form of coercion. Recall, parties to a social contract want to 
be able to pursue their diverse, conflicting conceptions of the good. One 
reasonable step to obtaining this goal is ensuring that everyone is at least able to 
engage in self-regarding conduct. To that extent, the general contract perspective 
in general seems to support the freedom to engage in self-regarding conduct. 
The other reason I gave above was that liberty coercion is severe because 
it restricts basic liberties, liberties that are given priority over greater wealth in 
Rawls’s theory of justice. Similarly, as I pointed out when discussing the public 
reasons against drug laws, the freedom to manage one’s body and health is a 
widely endorsed freedom. Combine that with the freedom of association and 
movement that Rawls explicitly protects as basic liberties in his first principle of 
justice and we have support for the freedom to do most if not all self-regarding 
conduct. In other words, freedom to engage in self-regarding conduct is part of 
the basic liberties (not necessarily “constitutional essentials” or “basic justice” 
which even Rawls’s moderate theory of legitimacy would protect). If I am correct, 
then Rawls’s justice as fairness in particular requires as a matter of justice that 
individuals be free to engage in self-regarding conduct. 
Now that I have made plausible the claim that that (criminal and/or 
Rawlsian social) justice forbids the criminalization of self-regarding conduct, I 
will now give some reasons why the extant laws that criminalize self-regarding 
conduct are not almost-just, even when we consider the social system in which 
they operate. Drug laws again are the focus of my analysis, but similar claims can 
be made for other criminalized self-regarding conduct. I realize I am riding a fine 
line because I argued that the social system in which the drug laws operate make 
these laws not-too-unjust. Yet, I think that holding the extant drug laws to the 
standard of not-too-unjust is too lax. Aspiring to drug laws that are just or almost-
just would provide a more persuasive standard to justify the legitimate use of 
liberty coercion. 
One reason to believe that the extant drug laws are not almost-just, even 
considering the system in which they function, is the excessive amount of 
punishment attached to violations of drug laws. The three-strikes laws are the best 
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example of excessive punishment.
162
 If one is convicted of three felonies, even if 
they are non-violent drug-related crimes, one is automatically sentenced to life in 
prison. Life in prison for non-violent felonies related to either the production, 
trafficking, or possession of drugs cannot be almost-just. 
It is true that keeping some people involved with the drug world in prison 
benefits (to some minimal extent) the social system in which the drug laws 
function. Perhaps, as I argued in general above, life in prison for three drug-
related felonies is not-too-unjust given the violence that is risked in many of these 
felonies. If so, then the laws would meet Rawls’s moderate standard of 
legitimacy. However, such an excessive punishment as life in prison for three 
non-violent felonies cannot be almost-just. If so, then the extant drug laws with 
excessive punishments such as the three strikes laws are not legitimate according 
to the strong version of the substantive requirement. 
Another related point to the excessive punishment that indicates that the 
extant drug laws are not almost-just is that less severe yet effective punishments 
are available for drug law violations. Violations of most drug laws are punishable 
by liberty coercion usually imprisonment. These punishments for violations of the 
drug laws could be made less severe by using other forms of liberty coercion 
(house arrest, drug rehab, community service) and by using more often only 
monetary coercion. It is beyond the scope of this paper to revise in detail the penal 
code concerning drug laws. The basic idea is that fines and less severe forms of 
liberty coercion can be used as drug laws penalties.  
Another modest reform indicates that the current drug laws are not almost-
just concerns marijuana. Marijuana could be completely decriminalized but still 
regulated through monetary coercion, primarily taxation. Decriminalizing 
marijuana and regulating it through taxation would accomplish three goals. First, 
those who use more harmful drugs would have incentive to switch to using 
marijuana to avoid criminal sanctions. Second, given that marijuana has few 
harmful health consequences (less than alcohol), is non-addictive, and has healing 
properties, the health of users of other drugs (including alcohol) who switch to 
marijuana would likely improve. Finally, the funds derived from taxing marijuana 
could be used for public programs to ameliorate any negative effects of marijuana 
itself and also to ameliorate the negative effects of other drugs. Thus, 
decriminalizing marijuana would make the drug laws, as a whole, less severe. 
Since the extant system refuses to completely decriminalize marijuana, does not 
opt for less severe liberty coercion as penalties for drug laws, and does not use 
monetary coercion only to penalize some drug laws, the extant drug laws seem to 
fail the strong substantive requirement; extant drug laws are not almost-just. 
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It is worth mentioning briefly that even a persuasive theory of criminal 
justice would probably allow state regulation of some self-regarding conduct. 
Self-regarding conduct that is criminalized currently can lead to extreme social 
problems if they were decriminalized without regulation. So, decriminalizing self-
regarding conduct such as drugs, prostitution, and gambling does not mean that 
the state would not have a continued role in these areas. That role may only be to 
provide education about their potential dangers and how to avoid them. 
Additionally, like alcohol and tobacco, the state’s role may be primarily taxing the 
conduct to deal with any negative social effects and discourage excessive use. One 
important difference between regulation of self-regarding conduct and the current 
ways such conduct is criminalized is that regulation would primarily involve only 
monetary coercion through taxation while the extant law primarily uses liberty 
coercion. Since taxation allows the self-regarding conduct to be done legally (at a 
price), individuals are not legally denied their basic liberty to engage in self-
regarding conduct. As long as the taxation is reasonable, then a legal system that 
only regulates self-regarding conduct would be almost-just if not completely just. 
The greater justice involved by shifting from criminalizing drugs to taxing 
drugs is an example of my earlier point about difference between Rawls’s theory 
of legitimacy and the strong version. If drugs were only regulated through 
taxation, then the coercion involve would be only monetary coercion. Recall I 
granted above that Rawls’s theory of legitimacy is adequate to justify laws 
involving monetary coercion. To that extent, drug laws using only monetary 
coercion would likely be not-too-unjust, meaning they would be legitimate 
according to Rawls’s theory. The problem is that criminal laws against drugs 
involve liberty coercion in their substance and often involve liberty coercion in 
their punishment. To deal with these more severe forms of state coercion, we need 
to adopt the more stringent substantive requirement of the strong version. 
Another reason that the extant law is not almost-just concerns reciprocity. 
Rawls values reciprocity considerably in his theory of justice and his theory of 
legitimacy.
163
 Reciprocity should lead to rough consistency in the legal system 
that concerns self-regarding conduct; each person should allow each other person 
to whatever self-regarding conduct each prefers. In fact, no such consistency 
exists.  
In the extant legal system, some self-regarding conduct is unregulated, 
some are regulated, and some are criminalized. No meaningful distinctions clearly 
justify treating various self-regarding conduct in these separate legal categories. 
The degree of risk to health and bodily integrity does not distinguish among self-
regarding conduct. For example, I am legally permitted to climb a dangerous 
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mountain greatly risking serious bodily injury and death to myself even if I am 
under-skilled and unprepared for the climb. In contrast, I am legally prohibited 
from ingesting drugs even if the risk is negligible and the risk is primarily a risk 
only to myself.  
Another example that I have alluded to is that adults are legally permitted 
to consume alcohol even though such is regulated. At the same time, adults are 
not legally permitted to consume marijuana even though science now indicates 
that alcohol is addictive and destroys one’s health while marijuana is not 
addictive, has negligible health risks, and even some health benefits. Other 
examples abound. We are not able to excuse these examples as we did above 
given the current social system in which they function because to some extent all 
self-regarding conduct will exist in such social systems. Thus, we should still 
expect similar treatment of self-regarding conduct given that they all function in 
less than ideal circumstances. Consequently, the legal system treats self-regarding 
conduct differently without meaningful distinctions to justify such. 
Since the legal system treats self-regarding conduct differently without 
meaningful distinctions, the legal system does not embody reciprocity for self-
regarding conduct. Since the legal system does not embody reciprocity in this 
area, at least some the laws involving self-regarding conduct are unlikely to be 
almost-just. I am not sure how to make this reciprocity claim more precise. 
Consider it another reason indicating that holding the extant laws to the strong 
substantive requirement, as opposed to Rawls’s moderate requirement, would 
likely reveal that many of these laws are illegitimate. 
Finally, many of the extant laws involving self-regarding conduct are not 
almost-just because there are laws that target specifically the indirect, other-
regarding effects of self-regarding conduct. As I mentioned earlier, one key aspect 
of conduct that makes it self-regarding is its other-regarding effects may not 
occur, vary among instances, occur only after a long stretch of time, depend on 
contingent circumstances, and can be nullified by planning or third-party 
intervention.  
My example above was when a person abuses a child while on drugs. The 
point here is that criminalizing drugs in part because they lead to child abuse is 
unneeded because other laws already prohibit child abuse regardless of what 
caused the adult to abuse the child. Since the laws against child abuse include 
child abuse resulting from the adult using drugs, the other-regarding effect (child 
abuse) from drug use would still be criminalized even if drug use itself were not 
criminalized. Since we do not even want to risk child abuse resulting from drug 
use, a compromise legal approach would be decriminalize drug use in general, but 
to criminalize drug use when children are nearby. 
From the child abuse example, we see that we can separate out the self-
regarding conduct with no negative indirect other-regarding effects from instances 
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of the self-regarding conduct that risk negative other-regarding effects. Drug use 
would be legal; drug use with children nearby would be illegal. This point about 
drugs is generalizable to many types of self-regarding conduct. We could only 
criminalize an otherwise self-regarding conduct when done in circumstances 
where other-regarding effects are likely (e.g. individuals could be prohibited from 
gambling with more than 2% of the annual income). Thus, we can use the 
criminal law to target only the indirect, other-regarding effects of self-regarding 
conduct without criminalizing all instances of the self-regarding conduct. The 
narrower the criminal laws are when they pertain to self-regarding conduct, the 
greater the freedom to engage in self-regarding conduct. 
To the extent that the criminal laws involving self-regarding conduct are 
not narrowly tailored to the circumstances where such can lead to negative other-
regarding effects, the criminal laws are too broad. The excessive breadth of these 
laws unjustifiably infringes the freedom of individuals to manage their own body 
and health, their freedom of movement, and their freedom of association. Since 
we can still get the benefits of criminalization by narrowly tailoring the criminal 
laws to the other-regarding effects, even if the criminal laws that broadly prohibit 
self-regarding conduct are not-too-unjust, these laws are not almost-just. 
So far, I have suggested some of the effects of strengthening the 
substantive requirement of Rawls’s theory of legitimacy to the strong version. 
Employing the strong version would indicate that many extant criminal laws 
especially those involving liberty coercion for self-regarding conduct are 
illegitimate. To the extent that these criminal laws are illegitimate, state coercion 
to enforce these laws is unjustified. 
In response to my suggestion that many of the extant criminal laws are 
illegitimate, an objector may worry that making more stringent Rawls’s theory of 
legitimacy may frustrate Rawls’s stated goal of his theory. Recall that Rawls aims 
to show how a society with a less-than-just legal structure can still justifiably use 
coercion to maintain stability. If my strengthening the requirements of the 
legitimate use of state coercion ends up showing that enforcing many of the 
state’s laws is unjustifiable, then the strong version of theory of legitimacy fails to 
show how a less-than-just society, at least one like the United States, can 
justifiably use state coercion to maintain stability. The worry is that many extant 
societies cannot justifiably perpetuate themselves. If so, then those states on their 
way to becoming more just cannot justifiably use state coercion to maintain their 
current level of justice. In the next section, I respond to this worry. 
 
Section Six: Illegitimate Law and Stability 
 Let me explicate further the worry I am responding to in this section. 
Rawls’s theory of legitimacy aims to tell us when state coercion is justifiable so 
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that the state can maintain the stability of the society over time. By making more 
stringent Rawls’s theory of legitimacy through adopting the strong version of the 
substantive requirement, many more of the extant laws would be illegitimate. If 
these laws are illegitimate, then the state is not justified in enforcing these laws. 
Without being justified in enforcing many of the laws, the state may not be 
justified in enforcing enough of the laws to maintain social stability (even if the 
state in fact maintains stability unjustifiably anyway). Thus, the worry is that 
strengthening Rawls’s theory of legitimacy may make the theory unable to justify 
what it set out to justify. Related to this worry is a concern that the strong version 
would not promote respect for political authority and would undermine the duty to 
obey the law. Both of these possible implications could also threaten social 
stability. 
 The objector launching this worry could take it in at least two different 
directions. One direction is to reject the strong version of the substantive 
requirement, maintaining Rawls’s theory of legitimacy as it stands. To take this 
direction, the objector would have to reject my arguments above affirming that 
Rawls’s (moderate) version of the substantive requirement is sufficient to justify 
state coercion to maintain stability. The other direction is that the objector could 
be persuaded by my arguments above that Rawls’s theory of legitimacy is not 
strong enough. The objector could then either reject Rawls’s theory of legitimacy 
altogether or propose an alternative way to strengthen the theory different from 
adopting the strong version of the substantive requirement. Having identified the 
diverging directions the objector could go, I will not explore them. Instead, I aim 
to cut off both options by showing that the stability worry has little force.  
To disable the stability worry I will use the same argumentative approach 
that I employed above. I hope to supply many reasons on the side of why the 
stability concern has little force outweighing the reasons for the contrary claim.  
The first reason I offer is that even if a law is illegitimate such that the 
state is not justified in enforcing the laws does not mean that individuals are 
justified in violating the law. Individuals may still have moral obligations to obey 
a law even if the state is not justified in enforcing the law. Thus, I am pointing out 
that the objectives that Rawls wants to obtain with his theory of legitimacy are 
separable. Rawls is correct to think that if a law is legitimate, an individual has a 
duty to obey that law. However, just because a law is illegitimate, it does not 
mean that an individual has no duty to obey the law. All it means is that the 
individual has no duty—derived from the legitimacy of the law—to obey the law. 
The individual’s duty to obey the law despite its illegitimacy may derive from 
another moral source. 
The moral sources for such duties are plentiful. The most relevant reason 
to this discussion is that individuals may have a duty to obey the illegitimate law 
to maintain the stability of the society. If so, then an individual’s obligation to 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3254058 
 
 
Page 46 of 54 
Judicious Imprisonment 
obey illegitimate laws would depend on how their violation of the law would 
affect the stability of the society.  
Consider an example. Suppose Framed is imprisoned because he was 
convicted of a law that he did not commit and the law Framed supposedly 
violated was illegitimate such as drug trafficking. Despite the injustice in 
Framed’s wrongful conviction and the illegitimacy of the liberty coercion in the 
law itself and its use of imprisonment, Framed’s friend, Vigilante, may not be 
justified in breaking Framed out of prison. The possible reasons are many. Such a 
prison break may cause a credible threat to social stability. Such a prison break 
may require violence against innocents morally prohibiting it.  
Alternatively, if Framed could escape from prison without violence or 
much fanfare, Framed would be committing no injustice because on multiple 
fronts the enforcement of the imprisonment was unjustified. Vigilante would not 
be committing injustice if she assisted Framed in such an escape for the same 
reasons; it is a move toward justice without countervailing moral considerations. 
The point is that an individual may avoid an illegitimate use of state coercion, 
even by breaking other laws such as those against prison escapes, if no other 
moral considerations (such as the risk of social stability or violence) forbid 
avoiding the illegitimate coercion.  
I will point out below that often no direct correlation exists between 
violating a law and social stability. For now, assuming that a violation of a law 
would lead to social instability, individuals may be morally obligated to obey 
even illegitimate laws to maintain social stability. Thus, making more stringent 
Rawls’s theory of legitimacy need not lead to instability. Even if making more 
stringent Rawls’s theory demonstrates that in fact more laws than we thought 
were illegitimate, individuals are not justified in violating these illegitimate laws 
at will. Instead, they may still be obligated to obey illegitimate laws to maintain 
social stability, although it is unlikely that violating many of the self-regarding 
laws at issue here would threaten social stability. All that failing to meet the 
strong version of theory legitimacy may mean is that the state is not justified in 
enforcing the illegitimate laws.
164
 
While the obligation to obey illegitimate laws is still injustice (in some 
sense) to those who would rather not comply with the law, this injustice is 
outweighed by the greater injustice that would occur from social instability. In 
this situation, we are choosing the lesser of two injustices. Doing so is not 
surprising in non-ideal theory; obeying illegitimate laws at times can be the 
burden of social life. Such burdens must be born if the alternative is a greater 
injustice.  
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Just because individuals may be obligated to obey illegitimate laws for the 
sake of stability does not leave these individuals powerless victims of injustice. 
These individuals can use various mechanisms to redress their grievances with the 
aim of getting the illegitimate laws changed and illegitimate punishments 
overturned. Using the political process to redress their grievances about 
illegitimate laws can maintain stability because it validates the political system in 
place. Stability can also be maintained because the discontent individuals comply 
with illegitimate laws while they are making their case to the public and the 
government that the illegitimate laws should be changed.  
The next reason why the stability objection has little force is that the legal 
system has mechanisms that could be employed to accommodate the violation of 
illegitimate laws without leading to instability. Two mechanisms are prominent: 
legal justification and judicial review. A legal justification is an affirmative 
defense where the defendant argues that even though she did the crime, she 
should not “do the time;” she was justified in they way she acted. The most well 
known of such defenses is the justification for killing in self-defense.  
One way to implement this legal mechanism would be to have a generic 
justification for self-regarding conduct. The justification would be: even though 
the person committed the crime, the person was justified in doing so because the 
conduct was self-regarding without even minimal risk of indirect effects on 
others. So, regardless of what is criminalized, if the defendant proves she never 
risked (even minimally) harm to others, then she would be acquitted of the crime 
due to this self-regarding justification.  
This particular justification does not exist in the extant legal system. My 
point is that justifications to crimes do exist in the extant legal system. So, using 
the mechanism of justification to allow individuals to combat illegitimate laws 
such as those that criminalize self-regarding conduct, the legal system itself can 
evaluate individual violations of the law to see if enforcing the law is justified. 
Using the legal system to evaluate individual violations of illegitimate laws 
reinforces the legal system leading to stability rather than instability. 
Judicial review is another legal mechanism that could be used to deal with 
illegitimate laws while affirming the legal system’s stability. Currently, judicial 
review is used to invalidate laws that conflict with state constitutions or the 
United States Constitution. Judicial review could be expanded to include the 
power of the courts to invalidate illegitimate laws. Judges could invalidate laws if 
the laws are not supported by any public reason, if the democratic process was not 
adequate, or if the laws are not almost-just. As with legal justifications, using 
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judicial review to deal with violations of the purported illegitimate laws would 
generally reinforce the legal system as a whole rather than lead to its instability.
165
  
Even though legal justifications and judicial review exist in the status quo, 
to apply them to deal with illegitimate laws would require modifications to the 
extant legal system possibly even constitutional amendments. With such 
modifications, using legal justifications and judicial review as a check on 
illegitimate laws would counteract destabilizing effects of the strong version. My 
point is that these modifications would reinforce the legal system by allowing 
these mechanisms to protect individuals against illegitimate laws. With these 
modifications, the strong version would not threaten social stability. Additionally, 
since Rawls’s own theory of legitimacy would invalidate some of the extant laws, 
even his theory would benefit from these mechanisms to deal with illegitimate 
laws in order to promote stability. 
Another reason that a more stringent theory of legitimacy may not lead to 
instability is that individuals may be justified in using certain forms of civil 
disobedience to protest illegitimate laws. While in some cases, as I argued above, 
individuals may be obligated to obey illegitimate laws for the sake of stability or 
other moral reasons, such an obligation may not always hold or may have 
exceptions. The exception may be that individuals may disobey illegitimate laws 
through public civil disobedience.  
Public civil disobedience involves violating laws, but it does so in a way 
that tries to convince the public and the government that the law is unjust. While 
civil disobedience can lead to social discord, civil disobedience also can reinforce 
the legal system. The message of civil disobedience is not that we should revolt 
and overthrow the government. Rather, the civilly disobedient can send the 
message: the legal system is worth preserving except for this one illegitimate 
aspect. The civilly disobedient can actually express their confidence in the justice 
in general in the legal system by doing their disobedience publicly. The civilly 
disobedient rely on the justice of their cause and society’s general commitment to 
justice to persuade the government and the public that the laws should be 
changed.  
In Rawls’s early work, he advocated civil disobedience as a justified 
mechanism to deal with state infringements on basic liberties.
166
 If we extend this 
idea to his theory of legitimacy, we have another mechanism to deal with the 
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stability concern. With the proper use of public civil disobedience, individuals can 
exercise their freedom to do what the illegitimate law forbids while at the same 
time garnering support for changing the illegitimate law. Since the illegitimate 
law is violated in a public manner, history suggests social stability is not likely to 
be highly threatened. Instead, the issue is thrust into the public square for 
reconsideration. The political process is affirmed by giving it another chance to 
assess the legitimacy of the law being publicly and civilly disobeyed. 
So far, in this section, I have been granting that disobeying the law in 
general and disobeying illegitimate laws in particular can lead to social instability. 
Obviously, in some cases this claim is true. Mounting a powerful revolution, 
committing a significant form of treason, and instigating widespread violent riots 
are legal violations that can lead to instability. If the state were not justified in 
using coercion to quash these activities and penalize them, then state coercion to 
maintain stability would be hampered. Note that even the strong version of the 
theory of legitimacy does allow the state to use liberty coercion (properly 
proportioned) to enforce these laws. I now want to suggest that aside from these 
obvious cases of violations of the law that lead to instability, other legal violations 
usually are not directly correlated to social instability. 
The first point to make is that most if not all societies with a legal system 
are able to maintain stability despite some level of law breaking. Societies do not 
even need to catch and penalize all law-breakers in order to maintain stability, 
even though the populace may have to feel that the state is acceptably effective at 
catching and penalize some of the law-breakers. How much law breaking a 
society can tolerate and how effective in the eyes of the populace the state needs 
to be at combating crime in order to maintain stability will vary among societies 
and over time. Let me refer to both of these aspects as the society’s “crime 
threshold.” As long as a society is at or below its crime threshold, the society will 
not be come unstable through crime (though it could become unstable through 
other means such as external attack). This point assumes that the inherently 
destabilizing crimes (revolution, treason, and riots) are not part of the law 
breaking that is taking place below the crime threshold. 
The point about the crime threshold suggests that the strong version of the 
theory of legitimacy need not lead to instability. As long as the crime—resulting 
from public awareness that more laws (than they previously thought) are 
illegitimate—does not push the society over its crime threshold, increased crime 
will not make the society unstable. Before the worry about instability can get off 
the ground, the objector would have to show that the strong version of the theory 
of legitimacy would lead to crime that would cause the society to exceed its crime 
threshold. 
The objector may think that the crime threshold point does not adequately 
address her concern. The objector’s concern is that with the more stringent theory 
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of legitimacy, state coercion cannot justifiably maintain stability by enforcing the 
laws if the state needs to do so. The last if-clause is key. The crime threshold 
point may indicate that the state coercion may not be needed most of the time, but 
if state coercion is needed to maintain stability, the strong version of the theory of 
legitimacy indicates that such state coercion is not justifiable. Consequently, the 
strong theory of legitimacy fails to justify state coercion to enforce the laws if 
such is needed for stability, or so an objector may contend. 
In response, I do not mean the crime threshold point to demonstrate that 
the strong version of the theory of legitimacy will always justify state coercion to 
maintain stability if needed. If all of a state’s laws are illegitimate, then the state 
may not be justified in enforcing its laws to maintain stability (though I think 
other issues not addressed here would need to be examined such as how likely 
would a more just society replace the increasingly unstable one). The same point 
would be true if all of the laws of a state were illegitimate according to Rawls’s 
theory of legitimacy. However, the crime threshold point makes it plausible that 
the strong version of the theory of legitimacy would not nullify the justifiability of 
state coercion enough to make instability a significant worry. Let me explain. 
As I argued above, the strong version of the theory of legitimacy indicates 
that state coercion cannot justifiably enforce more extant laws than Rawls’s 
theory of legitimacy indicates. I will refer to the laws that are justified by Rawls’s 
theory of legitimacy but would be invalidated by the strong version the 
“problematic laws.” The stability concern would only have force if the law 
breaking that threatens the stability of a society resulted from the “problematic 
laws.” As long as the stability was not threatened by the violation of the 
“problematic laws,” then the state would be as justified in using coercion to 
maintain stability under the strong version of theory of legitimacy as it would be 
under Rawls’s version.  
Additionally, as long as the populace did not highly value the problematic 
laws, it is unlikely that upon learning that the laws are illegitimate large amounts 
of people would lose their respect for political authority in general and abandon 
their duty to obey legitimate laws. Most individuals can understand that a system 




Furthermore, it is unlikely that violation of the “problematic laws” would 
need to be enforced in order to maintain stability. First of all, the main 
“problematic laws” in the United States that I have identified are already 
frequently flouted. The laws prohibiting self-regarding conduct (drugs, 
prostitution, and gambling) are widely flouted in the status quo without the 
stability of the society threatened.  
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In fact, the opposite may occur. If the state were able to figure a way to 
enforce most violations of the laws concerning self-regarding conduct, the 
enforcement of such widely sought after conduct may cause instability due to its 
oppressive effect.  
Not only is it likely that widespread enforcement of frequently flouted 
illegitimate laws could lead to instability, but it is also likely that even less 
enforcement of these illegitimate laws could better maintain stability. Less 
enforcement of the illegitimate laws would maintain stability for two reasons.  
First, those who flout these laws do not think they are legitimate. By 
letting these people do as they please without state intervention, these individuals 
may have less reason to be angry with the government and cause other 
destabilizing problems. They may prefer that the illegitimate laws were rectified, 
but an unenforced illegitimate law has little real impact on the individuals who 
disagree with and violate the unenforced law. The examples I have in mind are 
possession of small amounts of drugs (indicating they are for use rather than for 
sale), prostitution between independent (no pimp), consenting adults, and 
individuals gambling in their residences. If the state were not to pursue people 
engaged in such conduct, these people are less likely to be angry at the state and 
do other activities that are disruptive of social stability such as breaking other 
legitimate laws.
168
 Non-enforcement of these laws would actually make these 
people have more respect for political authority and more likely to fulfill their 
duty to obey legitimate laws. 
The second reason why less enforcement of illegitimate laws can help 
maintain stability is that enforcing the law is expensive. Providing police, courts, 
lawyers, juries, municipal buildings, prisons, prison guards, subsistence to 
prisoners, and the supportive staff for each of these functions can take many 
resources. The “war on drugs” in particular has been vastly expensive.
169
 Despite 
the vast expense, drugs in general have become cheaper and more readily 
available on the streets.
170
 In short, the vastly expensive war on drugs has failed 
on many fronts. Instead of spending so many resources enforcing illegitimate 
laws, these resources could be reallocated to apprehending violators of core 
criminal offenses (murder, theft, rape). Better enforcement of the core of the 
criminal law instead of the illegitimate self-regarding laws would likely yield 
much greater returns on social stability.  
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I have offered two reasons why less enforcement of illegitimate laws 
could yield greater stability: the state does not incite those who disagree with the 
law to cause other destabilizing problems, and the state can reallocate resources to 
enforcement of laws more vital to social stability. Thus, for many illegitimate 
laws, the state does not need to be able to justifiably enforce the law to maintain 
stability. Instead, the state merely needs to stop enforcing these illegitimate laws. 
To that extent, the strong theory of legitimacy would not lead to instability 
because the state can better maintain stability by not enforcing many illegitimate 
laws than by enforcing them. The bonus of not enforcing illegitimate laws (in 
addition to greater stability) is that not enforcing illegitimate laws means that the 
legal system better approximates justice. 
A point I mention in passing above should be emphasized regarding the 
issue of stability. Many factors in addition to the society’s crime threshold 
influence the stability of a society. I am not just referring to whether the society 
faces external threats such as invasion. Less salient are the ways that citizens can 
threaten social stability by performing certain activities or refraining from other 
activities, all of which is legal.
171
 Widespread non-violent protests, boycotting 
integral parts of the economy, or refraining from voting in large numbers could 
lead to social instability. Also, the government failure to regulate the economy or 
provide other public goods such as affordable health care could destabilize a 
society.  
The point here is not that Rawls’s theory of legitimacy needs to be 
modified or augmented to deal with these other factors of social stability. Rather, 
to maintain stability a state’s best options may not be enforcing illegitimate laws 
but rather bolstering the economy and bestowing benefits on the citizenry. These 
non-coercive elements may be able to maintain stability better than the state 
rigorously enforcing all of the laws in the society. The essential idea is that 
meeting people’s needs may produce greater social stability than punishing 
violations of the law. 
For these reasons, the strong theory of legitimacy does not pose a 
significant threat to social stability. Just the opposite could be the case. By having 
a more stringent standard for legitimacy, the criminal law could be reformed—
through the stability producing mechanisms or legal justifications and judicial 
review as well as other democratic processes—such that greater justice is enjoyed. 
Such a step toward greater justice would produce a better society, one worth 
maintaining. As the society progresses towards justice by adopting the strong 
theory of legitimacy, the society may be more stable because the citizens 
appreciate the state’s efforts to protect important liberties by reforming the 
criminal law. 
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Conclusion: Points to Remember 
 I want to emphasize two things. First, although my primary examples of 
extant laws that are illegitimate under the strong theory of legitimacy but 
legitimate under Rawls’s theory are laws involving self-regarding conduct, such 
should not be taken to mean that these laws are the only ones. There are laws 
involving other-regarding conduct that would also be delegitimized by adopting 
the strong version of the substantive requirement. Examples are trespassing laws, 
laws against lightly touching another person in a non-taboo spot (now considered 
battery), and property laws that give too much leniency to freeloaders. Also, while 
some laws would still be legitimate under the strong theory of legitimacy, their 
penalties may be illegitimate at least at the extreme ends of the possible sentences. 
Space has prevented a fuller discussion of these other laws that would be 
delegitimized under the strong theory of legitimacy. But, my not exploring them 
should not be construed to imply that they do not exist. 
 The second thing worth emphasizing is that the laws prohibiting self-
regarding conduct are not a trivial part of the criminal justice system. In fact, the 
“war on drugs” has made drug law enforcement alone a significant part of the 
criminal justice system. Nearly 20% of the people in prisons are non-violent 
offenders of drug laws.
172
 Aside from the vast expense from the enforcement of 
drug laws, we should also not forget the human suffering that has resulted—not 
from the ingesting of drugs or what intoxicated people have done—but from the 
enforcement of drug laws. Even vociferous supporters of drug laws admit that the 
enforcement of drug laws causes much suffering and crime.
173
  
Some commentators have projected that the enforcement of the drug laws 
as they are currently done could lead to the collapse of the criminal justice 
system.
174
 The criminal justice system cannot handle for much longer the number 
of people currently prosecuted and imprisoned for drug crimes.
175
  
Other laws involving self-regarding conduct are not causing as much 
problems to the criminal justice system as the drug laws are. But, we should not 
forget how many women engaged in prostitution must rely on pimps to avoid 
being prosecuted, pimps who beat and rape these women continuously. Pimps 
also take much of the money the women earn so that the pimps can keep the 
women dependent on them. 
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 Due to these reasons, I focused on laws criminalizing self-regarding 
conduct as those laws that would be delegitimized under the strong version of the 
theory of legitimacy. Reforming these laws are not just about letting aging hippies 
smoke doobies on the weekends. These laws involving self-regarding conduct 
have created multiple social tragedies. The strong theory of legitimacy seeks to 
make the state do better in its laws and use of coercion so that the state can stop 
ruining so many people’s lives.  
